It can happen anytime: experts dealing with the risk of a future İstanbul earthquake by Neumann, Laura Elise
  
 
 
 
 
“IT CAN HAPPEN ANYTIME”: 
EXPERTS DEALING WITH THE RISK OF A FUTURE ISTANBUL EARTHQUAKE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by  
LAURA ELISE NEUMANN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Institute of Social Sciences 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts 
 
 
 
 
Sabancı University 
January 2018 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Laura Neumann January 2018 
All Rights Reserved 
 
 iv 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
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LAURA ELISE NEUMANN 
MA Thesis 
January 2018 
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This research focuses on the ways in which Istanbul earthquake professionals, i.e. members 
of civil society organizations for disaster preparation and search and rescue, scientists, 
engineers, and civil planners, navigate the current preparations for a strong earthquake that 
is forecasted to affect the city at some point in the coming decades. While state institutions 
have implemented several programs and are facilitating urban transformation projects in the 
name of preparing the city for an earthquake, I argue this a neoliberal governing approach, 
which I refer to as “disaster neoliberalism,” has displaced the burden of preparation largely 
to individual residents of the city while disempowering some civil society organizations 
and privileging private companies. At the same time, this burden on individuals increases 
as class status decreases. Furthermore, I demonstrate that my expert interviewees occupied 
a complicated position, the limits of which they navigated through the use of laughter and 
humor. I show that in many cases, they oppose the cynicism concerning earthquake 
preparations that is all too prevalent within the city through their professional and personal 
initiative. At the same time, this thesis argues that the common narrative that inaction about 
preparations is part of “Turkish culture” may reinforce this cynical view and may be 
problematic for future disaster preparations due to its reliance on an idea of cultural 
essentialism and Occidentalism. 
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ÖZET 
 
“HER AN OLABILIR”: 
BEKLENEN İSTANBUL DEPREMİ ÜZERİNDE ÇALIŞAN UZMANLAR 
 
LAURA ELISE NEUMANN 
Yüksek Lisans Tezi 
Ocak 2018 
 
Tez danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Ayşe Gül Altınay 
 
Anahtar kelimeler: Uzmanlar, Deprem, Risk, İstanbul, Mizah 
 
Bu araştırma önümüzdeki on yıllar içerisinde İstanbul’u etkilemesi öngörülen şiddetli 
deprem üzerinde afet hazırlıkları, arama ve kurtarma alanında çalışan sivil toplum 
kuruluşları, bilim insanları, mühendisler ve şehir planlamacıları gibi İstanbul depremi 
üzerine uzman olan kişilerin mevcut hazırlıkları ne şekilde yorumladıkları ve 
yönlendirdikleri üzerine odaklanmaktadır. Devlet kurumları şehri depreme hazırlamaya 
yönelik birçok program uygulamaya ve kentsel dönüşüm projeleri devreye sokmaya 
başlamış olsa da, bu sürecin “afet neoliberalizmi” olarak tanımlayabileceğimiz bir 
çerçeveden yapılıyor olması, hazırlık sorumluluğunun ağırlıklı olarak şehrin sakinlerine 
bırakılması, sivil toplum kuruluşlarının güçsüzleşmesi ve özel şirketlerin ayrıcalık 
kazanması gibi sonuçlar doğurmaktadır. Bireylere yüklenen bu sorumluluğun sınıfsal statü 
düştükçe daha da ağırlaştığı gözlemlenmektedir. Bu araştırma göstermektedir ki uzmanlar 
bu süreçteki karmaşık rolleriyle başederken mizah önemli bir araç olabilmektedir. Aynı 
zamanda, pek çok durumda, deprem hazırlıkları konusunda topluma hakim olan kinik 
duruşa karşı uzmanların profesyonel ve kişisel alanda inisiyatif almayı seçtikleri 
gözlenmiştir. Öte yandan, bu tez, harekete geçememenin ve önlem almamanın “Türk 
kültürünün” bir parçası olduğu yönünde uzmanlar arasında yaygın olan görüşün, kültürel 
özcülük ve Garbiyatçılık fikrine sırtını dayıyor olmasından dolayı mevcut olan kinik görüşü 
güçlendireceğini ve gelecekteki afetlere yönelik çalışmalar açısından da sorun 
oluşturacağını iddia etmektedir. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
As one of the largest cities in the world, Istanbul is host to more than 15 million people 
who live in an area that stretches over 5,000 kilometers. The city is situated right next to the 
North Anatolian fault line, which runs just south of the city, under the Marmara sea. The 
reason why the exact location of the fault line is now known is the same reason why many 
residents of Istanbul understand that a possible earthquake looms in the future: namely, the 
1999 Marmara earthquake that struck a large area that included the industrial region of 
Izmit, the coastal city of Yalova and parts of Istanbul as well. After the movement of the 
plates during this massive seismic event, scientist were able to conduct projects under the 
sea to explore and map the fault line’s location next to the city of Istanbul. At the same 
time, the painful history of loss during the Marmara earthquake also reminds Istanbul 
residents that such a disaster happened in the past; due to warnings from scientists, it is 
generally known that another earthquake around magnitude 7.0 is forecasted to happen 
again on the same fault line, this time closer to Istanbul proper. In the Marmara earthquake, 
it was reported that around 17,000 people died, but the number is likely much higher, since 
this does not account for the missing (Green 2005).  
 
I first learned about the seriousness of this issue in 2011 when I moved to Istanbul for the 
first time, two months after which a small earthquake in western Turkey also shook parts of 
Istanbul and the house I was living in. I did not personally even feel the house move, but 
my roommate felt it and it sparked a discussion - as small earthquakes typically do - about 
the possibility of the large earthquake that is supposed to occur. For some residents of 
Istanbul, not only the smaller earthquakes in the region but also the condition of various 
buildings in the city remind residents about the danger of a possible earthquake threat. 
There are 41 districts and 782 individual neighborhoods in the city, and each one has a 
different history of construction and population. However, for many people I spoke with, 
many of the buildings that comprise the city are met with suspicion as to their safety and as 
to whether they would become dangerous in a possible earthquake. 
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This is not aided very much by construction standards in the city. During the process of 
writing this thesis, for instance, a group of friends and I went to lunch together in one of the 
central neighborhoods in the city. On our walk to the restaurant, we saw that a bulldozer 
had somehow been transported on the top floor of a three-story concrete parking garage, 
and the bulldozer was smashing materials and moving quickly on top of this building that 
was already crumbling. My friends and I all walked quickly, half-running, when we were 
on the street under the side of the building. When we asked another friend later why she 
didn’t join us for lunch in the end, she said she saw the bulldozer on top of the building and 
turned back, since this was the main road to reach the restaurant - she did not want to risk 
walking under it. 
 
When walking around the city, there are a myriad building styles, and if one examines the 
structure with one’s naked eye, there are some buildings that do not look strong or safe 
enough, such as the houses whose additional stories stick out above the rest of the floors 
and hang over the street below; these buildings are evidence of construction amnesties that 
are granted periodically and which legally allow such structures to stand, even though they 
are against the building codes. However, for the vast majority of Istanbul residents, if they 
are to walk around and try to assess a building’s safety merely by looking, the dilemma is 
that such a method can only be so accurate without the required knowledge about 
engineering and construction. What’s more, whereas some other countries such as Chile 
have widespread information campaigns educating the public about earthquakes and the 
specific risks they pose, Istanbul does not generally have signs and warning posts in public 
areas, and the current education programs have mainly been conducted in schools since 
1999, leaving out a significant portion of the population that left school after that time 
(Berlinski 2011).  
 
For this thesis, I spoke with people who do concern themselves with earthquakes in their 
professions in some way, whether through preparation efforts, research or city planning. 
These people were Istanbul residents, most of whom had lived in Istanbul for most of their 
lives, and whose jobs dealt with the topic of earthquakes in one regard or another. Thus, 
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they were people who both had a high level of knowledge about earthquakes and about the 
situation facing Istanbul in terms of another earthquake, as well. In this thesis, I attempt to 
explore how these professionals who dealt with the earthquake issue conceptualized the 
current situation in Istanbul in 2017. In terms of experts’ professional lives, I attempted to 
understand not only what work they themselves were conducting on this issue, but also 
what kinds of barriers or limits they may have met in their efforts when it came to helping 
prepare the city, especially since the person with whom I conducted my pilot interview had 
expressed a worsening of the preparation efforts in the city. I also attempted to understand 
how they navigated the risk of a large-scale earthquake in their personal lives: if they had 
an earthquake kit, if they avoided certain buildings in the city, and how they approached 
this risk in general in their daily life, especially as people who had a higher level of 
knowledge as compared to the general population. In the first main chapter, Chapter 2, I 
give a brief outline of the current conditions regarding preparation in the city when it comes 
to the concept of responsibility and four groups: individual residents, civil society 
organizations, scientists, and the state. In Chapter 3, I explore how the presence of humor 
or laughter featured in all of my interviews in various ways and with multiple possible 
interpretations as to how this spoke to people’s sense of agency regarding the earthquake 
threat just as it may possibly encourage inaction. In Chapter 4, I focus on the concept of 
encountering inaction, that is, how my interviewees talked about people close to them who 
did not take action against the earthquake, and how some of their explanations about 
“Turkishness” seemed to support this inaction through cultural essentialism. In the 
following sections I outline my methodology for my interviews, the context for my 
interviews, and an overview of some of the theories employed.  
 
1.1. Methodology 
 
I conducted my first pilot interview in May 2016 with Emre, but did not start the main 
interviews until February 2017, when I interviewed Dilek and interviewed Emre again, this 
time while recording the conversation instead of taking notes as in the pilot. I conducted 
my final interview in September 2017, so the interviews were spread out over a period of 
several months. Each interview lasted roughly an hour. Two or three only lasted 45 
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minutes, but a handful of others lasted around 1 hour 30 minutes. All 10 interviews were 
conducted almost completely in English, with the exception of a few comments and phrases 
in Turkish that my interviewee may not have known the translation for (in which case we 
often checked the meaning together online before proceeding if I also did not know the 
word).  
 
I found my interviewees by contacting civil society organizations focused on earthquake 
preparation or education and university geological and engineering departments, and 
through asking interviewees to refer me to any other professionals they knew who may be 
interested in speaking to me. In order to protect the privacy and anonymity of my 
interviewees, I have changed my interviewees’ names and have not given details about the 
institutions or organizations at which they worked. Before every interview, I let my 
interviewees know that they would be completely anonymous, even if they told me that it 
was okay if their real name was used; thus only pseudonyms are used for all interviewees. 
Two interviewees asked not to be recorded: Oktay and Ece. I conducted a full interview 
with Ece and a short interview with Oktay and I wrote notes during both interviews. 8 
interviews were recorded, bringing the interview count to 10. In total, I had eleven hours of 
audio that I transcribed from those 8 interviewees.  
 
Many of the people I spoke with were involved with earthquake preparation in more way 
than one: if they worked for a rescue organization, they may have also conducted research 
about preparation in another context; if they worked as a researcher, they may have joined a 
rescue organization in their free time to assist in the preparation efforts in another way. For 
this reason, it is hard to classify them into set groups, although I reached Emre, Oktay, 
Dilek, Osman and Hüseyin through civil society organization links while I reached Vedat, 
Ece, Yavuz, Filiz and Gülser through university and research center links. However, some 
people in the first group worked at universities and some people in the second group also 
talked to me about their work on disaster preparation training and rescue training. Of the 
civil society organizations, Emre worked at an organization focused on disaster preparation, 
Dilek and Oktay worked at a search and rescue organization, and Osman and Hüseyin 
worked as urban planners. Of the people I reached through universities, Vedat, Yavuz, and 
  
5 
Filiz were researchers in various types of engineering related to earthquakes, Ece was an 
architect, and Gülser was a seismologist. 
 
My questions were divided into two broad categories: personal and professional, although 
they overlapped as well. Although I had a list, I did not ask every interviewee every 
question, since I guided the questions according to what topics we had already covered and 
how much time was available. For personal questions, I asked, for example, whether the 
interviewee had ever experienced an earthquake, if they had an earthquake kit or an 
emergency plan for their household, and whether the earthquake risk affected their personal 
life. In terms of their professional work, I asked how their job connected to the earthquake 
risk, what they thought about their contribution to the earthquake preparations, and whether 
their work has changed since they got started in the field, for example. I also typically 
asked what they thought about the current preparations in the city, how ready they thought 
the city was for a future earthquake, and how they imagined such an earthquake in the 
future.  
 
1.1.1. Positionality 
 
When I emailed, called or went to offices in person to request interviews, I introduced 
myself as a student in the Cultural Studies Master’s program at Sabancı University. For 
many of my interviewees, I introduced myself and usually mentioned that I had lived in 
Turkey for a few years, and in a few cases we initially spoke in Turkish before the 
interview, especially if I was searching for interviewees and did not know who was 
comfortable speaking English at a particular office.  
 
One of the most important aspects of the research in terms of my positionality was my 
status as an American in Turkey. I usually mentioned how much time I had spent in Turkey 
for this reason, and for the people who I had not made it clear, it usually came up in 
interviews when they were describing something about “how things go” in Istanbul. In one 
case, Yavuz asked me how long I had been in Istanbul, and when I answered roughly two 
years, he said, “Two years - so you know the economy is here, the population is here, the 
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everything is here [in Istanbul].” This exchange also occurred with Hüseyin (Yavuz was 
one of my first interviews while Hüseyin was my last, thus explaining the difference in 
time spent in Turkey): 
 
Hüseyin: It's very- you know... how long have you been to Istanbul?  
Laura: Almost 3 years.  
Hüseyin: 3 years. It's hard to live Istanbul, it's hard to live in Turkey and it's getting 
every day harder. So, uh, we all try to stay calm.1 
 
As a foreigner and a foreign researcher at that, it is also possible that my positionality 
affected the types of answers my interviewees gave me or how they phrased their 
responses. In the end of chapter 4, I give an account of how frequently I was given the 
explanation that not preparing for a disaster is “Turkish culture.” As a foreigner, it is 
possible that my interviewees felt the need to contextualize themselves as specifically 
Turkish, and to explain “Turkishness” and “Turkish culture” as they conceived of it since I 
was not from Turkey. In many cases in my interviews, for instance in many of the answers 
given by Dilek, the personal pronoun “we” was used for actions taken all over Turkey, in 
the past and in the present. This was ostensibly used to refer to “we” as “people in Turkey” 
or perhaps “Turkey as a nation.” 
 
For instance, when I asked Filiz about whether the city was ready for an earthquake, she 
seemed to use “we” and “our” to refer to Turkey or Turkish people. She said: “None of our 
cities are ready to an earthquake. And then, so far... in our history, the, there are, there were 
not many serious actions toward the earthquake.” I noticed this pronoun in this answer 
specifically because she also noticed it: she made sure to correct herself to distinguish 
between “we” and the state. This is a continuation of her answer:  
 
“Now, after the ‘99 earthquake, we changed the strategy, I mean, the government 
changed the strategy. Now they put more importance on the pre-disaster 
preparedness [as opposed to post-disaster aid].” 
 
In this answer, it not clear whether the “we” referred to Turkey in general or her institution. 
In some cases in my interviews, it is not clear who “we” refers to, but many of my 
interviewees seemed to use it to refer to Turkish people as a whole. Oftentimes this seemed 
                                                          
1 Interviewees’ comments appear as in my transcription and have not been edited. 
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to refer to Turkish citizens, since, for instance, Ebru differentiated between the way Turkish 
people respond to disaster and how Syrian migrants in Istanbul respond; I discuss some of 
these issues further in Chapter 4. This raises the question of if and how they may have 
responded differently had they been interviewed by a researcher from Turkey. 
 
While I was a foreigner who did not grow up in Turkey in one sense, at the same time I was 
a resident of Istanbul just like my interviewees in another sense. While the amount of time I 
had spent in the city was much less than my interviewees, most of whom grew up in 
Istanbul, at the same time I was someone who experienced daily life in the city, who 
planned to stay there for the foreseeable future, and who was also invested in the city and 
its future on an emotional register. I primarily noticed this when I shared stories, 
experiences and -- as I discuss in Chapter 3 -- jokes and humorous remarks about my daily 
life in the city and about the earthquake risk. For my social circle back in the US, many 
stories about daily life did not seem to make sense to them, and my friends did not think the 
jokes about the earthquake were nearly as funny. Especially regarding dark humor about 
the earthquake, future uncertainty or violence, many in my US social circle did not “get the 
joke” or laugh uproariously as many of my friends in Istanbul did. This illustrated to me 
how my experiences and my ways of talking about them had adapted to Istanbul life, and 
they made me realize my emotional investment as well. Due to my connections in the city 
and my own residence there, I reacted emotionally when contemplating the possible 
earthquake in a way that someone outside of Istanbul, and without personal residence and 
investment in the city would typically not. This may have helped in understanding my 
interviewees as Istanbul residents, especially in Chapter 3 in regards to humor and in 
Chapter 4 inasmuch as I include a discussion of the emotions of my interviewees regarding 
people close to them failing to prepare.  
 
The fact that my interviewees were both experts on the earthquake while also being long-
term Istanbul residents was also important for their emotional and professional connection 
to the earthquake threat. When we discussed the future Istanbul earthquake, the question 
was not of a disaster hitting somewhere “over there,” even in another Turkish city or 
another country, but something that would affect the buildings in which we were holding 
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the interview, their houses, my house, or anywhere we would happen to be in the city; thus 
my interviewees and I shared that commonality. Simultaneously, as highlighted by the 
anthropologist Dominic Boyer, by interviewing people who were experts on this topic, I 
was conducting a form of “para-ethnography” or “studying sideways” as coined by George 
Marcus and Ulf Hannerz respectively (Boyer 2015; Marcus 2004; Hannerz 1998). While 
my interviewees were experts in their fields - which Boyer defines as “[actors] who have 
developed skills in, semiotic-epistemic competence for, and attentional concern with, some 
sphere of practical activity” - as a student trained in anthropology, I brought my own sets of 
knowledge and expertise to our interaction. Boyer states that this kind of dynamic in which 
both parties hold specialized knowledge “[creates] a situation in which one kind of 
knowledge specialist, the anthropologist, analyses the ideas, conversations and practices of 
another” (2008, 39). He then goes on to question how an expert can “meaningfully engage 
the social experience of another culture of expertise without calling into question, at some 
level, precisely that expertise that is the ostensible locus of their social practice and 
‘culture’?” (40). Boyer is concerned with the overlap between these two centers of 
knowledge, and how they may inspire anxieties on both sides but also possibilities of 
creating new forms of knowledge and understanding through shared field sites, such as in 
para-ethnography. He also notes, as was the case in my research, that it is difficult to 
engage with experts very much outside short interviews in their professional space; this was 
true for my fieldwork as well, since every interview was conducted in my interviewee’s 
office with the exception of one interview conducted over Skype from the interviewee’s 
home (43).  
 
Regarding this meeting of two different centers of knowledge, I acknowledged that at times 
I was using my interviews not only to understand my interviewees, but also to learn from 
them about the earthquake threat in general. Since I do not have formal scientific, 
architectural, engineering, civil planning or disaster preparedness training, there was much 
that my interviewees taught me about the current situation in Istanbul and about what we 
know about risk, earthquakes, and the response to earthquakes. Many of my questions 
would go back and forth between asking about what my experts knew about the situation to 
more questions that were more directed at their personal experience and understanding. 
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Thus I was both absorbing their formal knowledge and expertise (similar to what Boyer 
calls epistemophagy, or “the consumption and incorporation of external analytics”), 
especially about how they view and assess risk, just as I was inquiring about topics that 
tended to go outside of their expert knowledge, such as whether their family had an 
emergency plan or what they thought about the safety of their workplace. I also realized 
during the process of the research that my own desire to understand exactly how “risky” or 
dangerous certain areas, buildings or structures might be also prompted many of my 
questions about the nature of risk and how much we can understand it (for instance, in my 
discussion of prediction versus forecasting in Chapter 2). This once again showed my 
connection with my interviewees as someone who lives and resides in Istanbul, but who 
possesses much less knowledge of the earthquake risk, the city’s buildings, engineering and 
structural concerns, and so on. My research participants thus also helped me to 
conceptualize the current issues and status of the city as I also analysed our interviews from 
the point of view of a social science researcher. In this fashion, there were many different 
points of commonality, such as residence and expertise, just as there were points of 
distance, as when I took a step back when transcribing and writing in order to show what 
our interviews may mean from an anthropological perspective.  
 
Finally, my interviewees were also interested at times in my perspective as someone trained 
in anthropology and culture, and as someone researching Istanbul preparation with a “bird’s 
eye view.” For instance, on a more personal level, one interviewee asked me what I thought 
about his reaction to the earthquake threat after I asked him how he dealt with the 
possibility of this disaster. He asked me if I thought he was calm compared to other people 
I had spoken to, which I interpreted both as a question about how he compared in his field, 
if other people working on this issue were also “calm,” but also as way to self-reflect on his 
own performance of expertise, since being “calm” was important in his own self-
representation as a scientist and expert. Another interviewee, whose pseudonym I will also 
not mention, told me that she is very interested in the cultural aspect of disaster preparation. 
I have since emailed with her and shared some articles that I found useful and that seemed 
to cover topics we did not speak about in our own interview. With Hüseyin, we discussed 
topics in our interview several times that covered politics and culture generally, and he 
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mentioned that he himself asks his students for feedback and interaction on their thoughts 
as to why there is such a lack of action concerning the earthquake issue in Istanbul; he also 
expressed interest in reading this thesis. In these ways, there were many points at which my 
interviewees showed that they were also interested in gaining knowledge from others 
outside their discipline. At the same time, I offer my own analysis of this culture discussion 
that I engaged with many of my interviewees on in-depth in Chapter 4, since the idea of 
“culture” they used did not seem to match with the generally accepted conceptualizations of 
“culture” in anthropology today; I state that this has political ramifications for the 
preparation situation overall (Grillo 2003).  
 
1.2. Literature review 
 
As a research project, this thesis sits at the intersection of several different fields: on one 
hand, it is concerned primarily with the idea of a disaster, upon which the field of disaster 
studies is based. Susanna Hoffman and Anthony Oliver Smith’s anthology Catastrophe and 
Culture: The Anthropology of Disaster covers many such examples in the field of 
anthropology in particular. One diffence between those studies and this thesis is the focus 
on a disaster that has not yet happened, but the possibility of which is being prepared for in 
the present. In terms of research and theses written on earthquakes in Turkey, many have 
been written from the perspective of psychology, trauma, and engineering in relation to the 
1999 earthquake and its effects. This thesis concerns a disaster in the future, and about 
current feelings and expectations about something that has not happened, but has been 
predicted. As such, the thesis is more closely related to studies about the anthropology of 
the future and studies on the risk of disaster as well as disaster management (Beck 1992; 
Newhouse 2017; Lakoff 2008; Choi 2015; Anderson 2010; Hu 2010).  
 
One project, the cultural anthropology PhD dissertation of Elizabeth Angell, covers the 
preparations for a possible Istanbul earthquake, and some themes from this research are 
covered in her 2014 article (Angell 2014). The study of the Van earthquake of 2011 by 
anthropologist Marlene Schäfers also covers an earthquake in Turkey, but it also includes a 
discussion about the future and future earthquake risk through its discussion of Van 
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residents’ fear of aftershocks after the main earthquake (Schäfers 2016). Schäfers’ 2014 
article about the response to the Van earthquake in terms of civil society organizations is 
also relevant (2014). Several studies have been conducted, primarily through surveys, in the 
fields of risk management and disaster planning, on the topic of how Istanbul residents are 
preparing for the earthquake risk and how risk is perceived (Tekeli-Yeşil et al. 2010a; 
Tekeli-Yeşil et al. 2010b; Eraybar et al. 2010; Karanci 2013). Two key articles have also 
covered how disaster preparation has become the rhetoric by which large-scale urban 
transformation projects have been justified by the state (Demirtaş-Milz & Saraçoğlu 2014; 
Bartu Candan & Kolluoğlu 2008). For my first main chapter and its evaluation of the 
current preparation efforts in the city, I draw on studies that evaluate the 1999 earthquake 
and its response by the state, civil society and individuals, such as “A Critical Analysis of 
Earthquakes and Urban Planning in Turkey” and “Civil Society and the State: Turkey after 
the Earthquake” (Sengezer & Koç 2005; Jalali 2002; Kubicek 2002; Jacoby & Özerdem 
2006; Jacoby & Özerdem 2008). In addition, since there is no such thing as a “natural” 
disaster and since the state of Turkey also does not differentiate between “natural” and 
“non-natural” disasters through its main instituion for the management of disaster, the 
Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi 
Başkanlığı, hereafter AFAD), I draw upon the Master’s thesis by Sumru Tamer (n.d.). Her  
research explored the response of AFAD to three recent events or “disasters” in Turkey: an 
influx of refugees into the city of Suruç, the deaths of 301 mine workers at Soma, and the 
2011 Van earthquake. However, with the exception of the 2014 piece by Angell, this thesis 
draws on studies in related fields of study in order to illustrate the current situation of how 
experts confront and live with risk in Istanbul during the time of my fieldwork.  
 
1.3. Theory 
 
The theme that ties together the three main chapters can be said to be the idea of risk, 
namely the current structures in place today in regards to the earthquake risk, and my 
interviewees’ responses and encounters with risk and risk reduction actions in Istanbul. In 
the second chapter, one of the main inspirations I use my analysis of the situation overall is 
Vivian Choi’s article “Anticipatory States: Tsunami, War, and Insecurity in Sri Lanka,” 
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which covers, like my own field, a past disaster and a possible future disaster in a country 
whose state has a large role to play in disaster response and risk management. What’s more, 
her work also includes fieldwork among Sri Lankan residents and an analysis of their own 
feelings of anticipation of disaster (2015). Choi describes Sri Lanka during her fieldwork as 
a site of “disaster nationalism,” and I employ the research by Tamer to contextualize this 
for Turkey, showing that nationalism usually factors into the state response after a disaster 
has already occured in Turkey. I also reference her insightful description of how an affect 
of “care” and mourning are instrumentalized in these post-disaster responses. However, for 
the purposes of this thesis, I state that Istanbul is more aptly described as being a site of 
“disaster neoliberalism” when it comes to the earthquake preparation environment. 
Neoliberalism affects the way in which individuals must prepare for possible disasters 
themselves, and it also accounts for the way in which civil society fails to have a strong and 
comprehensive relationship with the state. When I address the role of scientists and experts, 
I draw upon research in science studies that evaluates how scientists working on 
earthquakes have been affected by recent criticism of and even criminalization of 
seismologists by governments, particularly in regards to the case of the L’Aquila 
earthquake in Italy (Joffe et al. 2017). In addressing the current role of the state in terms of 
the earthquake preparations, I draw on the myriad literature on urban transformation in 
Istanbul just as I incorporate assessments that state that rising authoritarianism has affected 
the political environment in Turkey in recent years (Baybars-Hawks & Akser 2012; Günay 
& Dzihic 2016; Eraydin & Taşan-Kok 2014; Akçalı & Korkut 2015; Güzey 2016; Adanalı 
2013; Gibson & Gökşin 2016). Through this theoretical background I attempt to map out 
the some of the relations between these different actors and some of the conditions in the 
city during my fieldwork. 
 
In the Chapter 2, I draw on studies of humor and laughter, especially in regards to politics 
and various political environments, and through an analysis of the function of “joke-work” 
to consider how my interviewees reacted to the uncertainty inherent in the earthquake risk 
situation in Istanbul (Trnka 2011; Bernal 2013). In Chapter 3, I use analysis of affect and 
emotion, primarily through the work of Sara Ahmed, to interpret the possible position of 
my interviewees in regards to affect when they relate to their friends, family, and people 
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close to them; I also consider issues of cultural essential in interviewees’ oft-repeated 
explanations of inaction through “Turkish culture.” I also bring up how my study compares 
to research on risk that takes a more top-down and financial view of risk as productive.  
 
Overall, in this thesis I argue first that, through the current “disaster neoliberalism” in 
effect, the burden of responsibility to prepare for a large earthquake is largely shifted to 
individuals; while the Turkish government does operate on various levels in terms of 
conducting disaster management, the approach appears to be more and more centralized at 
the cost of pushing out some civil society organizations centered around disaster response 
and management. In the middle of these groups, scientists and experts strategically 
navigated their position as public figures in terms of politics just as they used emotional or 
social tactics like stigmatization in order to differentiate themselves from other public 
figures in the media. Furthermore, I argue that the frequent occurrance of laughter and 
humor showed that experts may have been reacting to an overwhelming situation in which 
they did not have many avenues through or resources with which to act, but that at the same 
time humor supplied a form of agency through the construction of narratives and sense of 
in-group feeling. Finally, I demonstate that while much of the literature on risk considers 
risk to be something “productive,” I make the point that this productivity decreases as one’s 
relative economic and political power decreases, with individuals mainly only producing 
anxiety in response to this risk. In terms of experts as subjects, I analyze how my 
interviewees’ reactions to the people close to them in their lives who have failed to take 
action against an earthquake shows that they can be considered, in a sense, “affect aliens” 
as coined by Sara Ahmed, and that they thus reject the cynicism described by Yael Navaro-
Yashin in taking purposeful action on this topic.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Dynamics of responsibility in the Istanbul preparation field 
 
During my fieldwork in Istanbul in 2017, many factors came together to emphasize an 
environment in which many experts on the news media cautioned Istanbul residents that an 
earthquake would occur at sometime in the coming decades, which subsequently put 
emphasis on the idea that the city should do something to prepare for the disaster before it 
occurs. This relates to the idea that there is no such thing as a “natural” disaster - especially 
in the case of earthquakes, a large amount of the risk level for such an event comes down to 
the physical building itself and how it was constructed. Earthquakes are primarily a high-
risk disaster only for developed urban areas, since sparsely populated rural areas with one-
story buildings have less risk, for example, due both the low population and a lower-risk 
building structure. 
 
Thus it can be said that, for many in Istanbul, a possible future has been conjured up that 
emphasizes anticipatory action to mediate the damage and loss from a possible earthquake. 
This is not the only future that Istanbul residents can imagine or anticipate, of course, since 
some media sources have also spread an idea that such an earthquake will definitely not 
come in our lifetimes- thus creating a safer possible future that residents may be able to 
hold on to with reduced anxiety and with a reduced burden of action needed to be taken in 
the present. However, if such a future in which an earthquake will very likely occur in the 
following decades is taken up, the issue of responsibility and accountability concerning 
preparation also becomes relevant.  
 
In this chapter, I use the notion of responsibility to evaluate four different groups or levels 
within the landscape of Istanbul earthquake readiness: individuals, civil society groups, 
scientists, and the state. The main theory through which I place these actors and their 
responsibility is the idea of neoliberalism; specifically in the case of the earthquake I term 
this “disaster neoliberalism” as an alteration of Choi’s “disaster nationalism” (2015). Under 
this type of government, individuals are left to bear the responsibility of earthquake safety 
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largely on their own, while civil society also faces challenges in terms of lack of support or 
even obstruction by the state. I also note that the general political instability in Turkey in 
the past few years has hurt civil society organizations’ effectiveness, as have increasing 
efforts at centralization of control over disaster areas by the state as opposed to civil society 
organizations. Scientists, as public intellectuals, have negotiated their role and 
responsibility through their narratives they express to the public, shunning excessive 
responsibility put on their shoulders and reminding the public that earthquake preparation is 
crucial to focus on. In terms of the role of the state, I show that disaster neoliberalism is 
still very much about nationalism, as well as the state, in terms of its partnership with 
capital and the way it prepares for disaster. In particular, the state’s efforts in recent years to 
exert control over sites of disaster through institutions such as AFAD (the Disaster and 
Emergency Management Presidency), as discussed by Schäfers and Tamer, point towards a 
strategy by the state to become the only main actor and the hegemonic actor in a post-
earthquake scenario in Istanbul.  
 
2.1. The Push Towards Individual Preparation 
 
Under neoliberalism, what may have previously been the domain of the state or civil 
society groups becomes the responsibility of the individual as the state is “hollowed out” 
and placed in private hands: it thus becomes beneficial for the state and private companies 
to encourage a notion of “individual responsibility” to replace state or collective action. As 
the geographer David Harvey summarizes, “This is a world in which the neoliberal ethic of 
intense possessive individualism and its cognate of political withdrawal of support for 
collective forms of action can become the template for human socialization,” citing as an 
example a Norwegian study that charted an increase in individualistic language in the 
media over a period of decades (Harvey 2008; Nafstad et al. 2007). In their study on the 
effects of neoliberalism on two different neighborhoods in Istanbul, Ayfer Bartu Candan 
and Biray Kolluoğlu recount that Turkey and Istanbul have experienced a liberalization 
process of the economy starting in the 1980s, during which the state changed many legal 
codes to allow more privatization and state co-operations with private companies (2008, 
12). This push towards placing the burden of “change” on individual people has been 
  
16 
documented, for instance, in the case of environmental preservation: even though 
corporations account for the bulk of carbon emissions, individuals are encouraged to limit 
their car use or the number of flights they take. In the same vein, some companies offer 
consumers the ability to “offset” their individual carbon output for a flight they take by 
paying an extra fee equivalent to the output. Under neoliberalism, the individual is 
encouraged to take care of her or his individual responsibility on various matters through 
participation in the market. This emphasis on the responsibility of the individual often 
obscures the much more powerful and effective role that corporations and the state play in 
environmental degradation.  
 
In the same way, much of what I encountered in the field in terms of earthquake 
preparation in Istanbul also focused on one’s individual responsibility to prepare oneself as 
opposed to collective action. A theme that came up many times was the idea of an 
earthquake kit, i.e. a stock of non-perishable food, water, medical supplies and survival 
items that would help to survive the first 72 hours after an serious earthquake. However, 
these earthquake kits need to be prepared each time by the individual, just as they must be 
replaced each year with new food, batteries, and medical supplies. These seem to have been 
provided at times on the municipal (belediye) level, since I found out that Beşiktas 
Municipality provided businesses with a small first-aid kit at no charge at least one time in 
the past. However, there did not seem to be an expansive coordinated program that 
provided earthquake kit materials in the city. Inherent in this idea is that the individual 
consumer has enough extra income to purchase and renew these supplies each year, which 
creates a classist dimension to this responsibility to prepare. In addition, this general lack of 
outreach showed that, in terms of the particular form of neoliberalism at work in Istanbul 
during my fieldwork, the burden of preparation was pushed to their shoulders of individuals 
despite the existence of a centralized institution responsible for the management of 
disasters across Turkey, AFAD. 
 
The issue of housing is another responsibility that is pushed onto individuals by the state 
without sufficient support for many Istanbul residents. If one wants to live in a safer house, 
if they have the financial means, they may seek to live in a house that was built after 1999 
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when the building codes changed after the Marmara earthquake, or after 2007 when they 
were updated once more; this may reduce one’s risk in a future earthquake. However, these 
newer apartments also require a higher income. Under the Disaster Law passed in 2012 
(Law No. 6306 on Disaster Prevention and Transformation of High Risk Areas), owners of 
an “unsafe” apartment building may have their building destroyed and rebuilt in 
compliance with earthquake building codes. They may do this if their building is checked 
and found to be unsafe. However, under the law, only two-thirds of the building owners 
must agree about the building being destroyed; they may purchase the other one-thirds’ 
property in order to continue with the demolition plan. This disadvantages the remaining 
one-third of owners if they disagree with the majority in their building. What’s more, even 
if the owners cannot agree, the government has the right to conduct “urgent expropriation” 
after one year, through which they can force the building to be destroyed and rebuilt 
(Kentsel Dönüşüm ve Hukuk Platformu). More importantly, though, under this law tenants 
and people without legal property documents have no rights - besides a “one-off payment” 
for tenants (Adanalı 2013, 39). They are often informed with little notice that the building 
will be demolished. In the case of tenancy, the apartment owners may benefit from the 
increased real estate value of their new apartment, but the previous renters may be priced 
out of the new building, since it often increases greatly in real estate value. In his article 
criticizing the 2012 law, urban studies scholar Yaşar Adnan Adanalı states that “the 
participation of local stakeholders was envisaged neither during the drafting of the law nor 
in the aftermath – aside from bearing its costs,” referring to the costs of inspection and 
demolition (2013, 39). For the poor who are affected by this law, they also bear the social 
costs as they are often pushed out of their communities and forced to start over in another 
area of the city. This also shows once again that under this particular “disaster 
neoliberalism,” while the state has touted “urban transformation concentrated on 
earthquakes” (deprem odaklı kentsel dönüşüm) as a state initiative, its effects on the 
Istanbul are very much unevenly distributed (Angell 2014, 674).  
 
In terms of the 1999 Düzce earthquake, a similar plight of renters and occupants without 
property rights was highlighted as they were not entitled to new houses given by the state 
after the earthquake. Of the civil society groups advocating for Düzce earthquake survivors, 
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DepDer was one group that campaigned for tenant and non-owner earthquake survivors to 
also receive housing from the state; this struggle is still on-going today for many non-
owner Düzce survivors who were left homeless after the 1999 disaster (Johnson 2011, 418; 
Düzce Umut Atölyesi). Thus, while the pressure is on the individual “consumer” to secure 
their own safe housing within the market structure, tenants, those without sufficient 
financial means, and occupants of houses without official property rights are punished 
under this neoliberal shift of responsibility to the individual. The state assistance that is 
provided in this case only benefits owners; not only do they typically receive a home higher 
in real estate value, but their new home is likely safer in a future earthquake as well. In 
addition, it benefits the construction company itself, as most buildings are constructed with 
at least one extra story so that the company can sell the new, unoccupied apartment floor(s) 
for a profit. The individuals most disadvantaged by this are those who lack formal property 
titles (tapu), since they are forced back onto the increasingly expensive housing market. 
Most likely they will still not be able to afford earthquake-safe, newer housing if they could 
not before, and in many cases following urban transformation, non-owners and the poor in 
general are pushed to the margins of the city, due to general housing prices or as a part of 
the state’s program itself, as has been done under the Mass Housing Administration (TOKİ) 
frequently in the past (Harvey 2008; Saraçoğlu and Demirtaş-Milz 2014).   
 
The affective burden is also pushed onto the individual under this form of neoliberal 
capitalism. Individuals must research and educate themselves about safe areas, safe forms 
of housing, individual preparatory measures, and how to best navigate these systems for 
their own reduction of risk. As I describe in Chapter 3, since the exact level of risk is 
typically unclear to many Istanbul residents, this is a particularly stressful and confusing 
process to navigate as an individual since civil society or state-supported education 
campaigns are not relatively few in comparison to Istanbul’s population, and since such 
sources of support and information like community education centers are lacking. For this 
reason, some civil society groups have proposed the future creation of open community 
education centers concerning earthquakes (Johnson 2011).   
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The idea that the modern subject must contend with and navigate various types of risk has 
been covered under the major theories of risk, among them the most well-known being 
Ulrich Beck’s Risk Society (1992). Expanding and critiquing this approach to risk, Engin 
Isin argues that the “rational subject” that has been the basis of neoliberal society (in its 
responsibility to make rational decisions about its own risk-prevention) is accompanied 
now by a “neurotic subject” that must deal with various risks in a way that results in 
personal anxiety (2004).  
 
As I argue further in Chapter 4, sociological surveys of various high-risk Istanbul 
neighborhoods have been conducted and have shown that a significant portion of those 
surveyed are not taking steps to prepare for a possible large earthquake. However, the 
neoliberal push I have outlined seems to have set the stage for general inaction in terms of 
making disaster preparations on an individual level. For instance, while children started 
receiving earthquake training in schools after 1999, Istanbul residents who left the 
education system before that time have not received such information on a systematic level. 
The relative lack of awareness-raising, training and support for earthquake preparation may 
encourage an environment of inaction for individuals. Even owners, who benefit from the 
state’s 2012 disaster law, are forced into a bind through the stipulation that buildings 
deemed “unsafe” must be destroyed in one year. This push to make renewal mandatory 
may prevent some owners from even having their home checked if they would like to take 
other steps besides demolishment (such as retrofitting) if their home is found to be unsafe. 
Thus, while this is one facet of the law that may encourage inaction, in general, the 
neoliberal governing approach seems to have left many individuals in Istanbul unsupported 
and unsure about how to prepare, just as they are left to manage the anxiety about the 
earthquake on their own.  
 
Additionally, what I found in the course of my fieldwork is that many of the search and 
rescue and disaster preparation education groups also push an individualist narrative about 
how to prepare for an earthquake. They focused on securing “non-structural hazards” in 
one’s home that can fall or crash during an earthquake event, and encouraged people to 
secure any furniture to the wall. Chemicals and other hazardous materials are also be 
  
20 
checked to make sure that they do not become a health risk after an earthquake. While non-
structural hazard mitigation is indeed very important, the fact that many of the prominent 
civil society organizations promoted non-structural, individualist changes also seemed to 
speak to the dominance of this type of action as the main course of action promoted in the 
public arena. With this being said, many of my interviewees in such organizations lamented 
the condition of the city’s building stock and emphasized that structural changes were more 
important. Furthermore, there are also civil society and activist groups in the city, 
especially organized around specific neighborhoods, that contest and oppose urban 
transformation and systematic construction changes regarding earthquake preparation, such 
as those based on the 2012 Disaster Law. Thus civil society groups are generally varied in 
that some focus on non-structural changes while some have more political and structural 
demands. In the following section, I assess the current status of civil society groups, 
especially in light of recent political instability and increasing control of the civil society 
arena by the state.   
 
2.2. Civil Society and Hindered Efforts at Responsibility 
 
Much of the literature on civil society in Turkey in regards to disasters has noted the idea, 
popular in the field of disaster studies, that both the state and a strong civil society are 
needed together to comprehensively and effectively prepare for and respond to disasters 
(Johnson 2011, 416; Kübicek 2002; Jalali 2002). In evaluating various takes on the 
relationship between the state and civil society in Turkey since the 1999 earthquake, 
depending on the field examined and the time period, many factors seem to differ 
depending on which author is read (Jacoby & Özerdem 2011; Johnson 2011; Kübicek 
2002; Jalali 2002). One common thread that runs through the analyses previously cited is 
the way in which the 1999 Marmara earthquake hurt public perception of the Turkish state 
due to the inadequacy of its response, and that civil society organizations stepped up in the 
wake of the disaster to provide services that the state had not. Moreover, within a few years 
of the 1999 earthquakes, civil society was in general weakened in power vis-a-vis the state 
for various reasons - among them opposition by the state (Kübicek 2002; Johnson 2011; 
Jacoby & Özerdem 2010). These studies also pointed out, though, that the state did provide 
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support at that time to some civil society organizations, namely those that were close in 
aims and ideology to the state (Johnson 2011; Jacoby & Özerdem 2008).  
 
Another factor upon which many of these studies were in agreement about was that groups 
that supported Kemalism, the military and/or secularism were more favored by the state. 
The timing of their studies is therefore important, since most were studying the 1990s and 
the first decade of the 2000s. Islamist and left-wing groups were the ones given less priority 
or were in an oppositional relation to the state of the time (Jalali 2002, 128; Johnson 2011, 
426). For this reason, it is crucial to note how drastically political favor and ideology has 
changed within Turkey in the past few years, even since the early 2000s. For one, since the 
ruling party is based on conservatism and Islam, the civil society organizations on the 
“outside” are now the secularist or Kemalist-leaning organizations. For instance, while the 
civil society search and rescue organization AKUT was the favorite of the state in the 
1990s, in the past year its former head resigned from his post after heavy political pressure 
due to his criticism of the ruling party during a television broadcast (Jacoby & Özerdem 
2008, 306; Hürriyet Daily News). It is important to note that in my research, I only spoke to 
people in organizations with generally secular backgrounds; I did not do fieldwork with any 
conservative or religious-based groups. Speaking to groups of wider political backgrounds 
would have enhanced my understanding of different political groups’ current relation to the 
state, and it would definitely compose the next step in a continuation of this research. 
However, speaking to the secularist groups that I did showed a currently strained 
relationship between these organizations and the state. 
 
For instance, one of my interviewees who is connected to a civil society organization 
generally termed to be on the left of the political spectrum said this: “We keep trying as 
what we can do, but I'm not sure if it's working, you know. Because day by day we are 
getting ignored by the [government] institutions.” Another interviewee, when I asked him if 
the government was listening to the recommendations that his group made about how to 
change the current preparation efforts, simply laughed in response to my question. He went 
on to say that this was a problem for Istanbul’s preparations, since many recommendations 
from civil society organizations were being ignored by the relevant government 
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institutions. Another interviewee who worked for an organization that has been termed 
more secular complained about not only being ignored, but about having funds blocked and 
taken away from their group due to their political stance.  
 
In general, the groups that give earthquake education trainings to members of the public 
were often civil society organizations (as opposed to the state handling this alone). This 
shows that civil society is still taking up this part of the responsibility of spreading 
awareness and education about the dangers of an earthquake and what Istanbul residents 
can do. They continued this work despite being ignored or blocked by the government due 
to their political stance.  
 
While my interviewees only noted anecdotes from their own organizations, it is the case 
that as of November 2016, 1,495 non-governmental organizations had been shut down by 
the government. This was done in the context of the state of emergency that has been 
implemented in Turkey since the coup that was attempted in July 2016 (Çetingüleç 2016). 
Since the articles I cited on the condition of civil society disaster preparation groups in 
Istanbul have been published, the political field has both changed drastically in terms of 
which groups are favored and which ones face an adversarial relationship with the state in 
general. This political instability in general most likely makes it difficult for groups of any 
political position to build and expand their efforts, since the political conditions determine 
how much support or resistance they may receive from the state, and this may change at 
any given time. In addition, one of my interviewees noted that this political instability 
affected his group’s work due to the increased suspicion and polarization that it caused 
amongst possible recipients of the organization.  
 
In this manner, the civil society participants I spoke with whose efforts were being ignored 
or blocked, or whose programs were being hurt by general political instability, expressed 
frustration or anger about this situation. As noted, one interviewee was unsure whether his 
group’s work was in vain or not due to being ignored by the relevant “decision makers” in 
the process of preparing the city. 
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As noted, while my research included mainly secular-leaning organizations, the opposition 
they reported seemed to be in line with the findings of Schäfers and Tamer that the 
formation of the agency AFAD under the direction of the Presidency has served to 
streamline and consolidate state power when it comes to the management of disasters like 
earthquakes. As shown by Schäfers in her study of aid given by AFAD after the 2011 Van 
earthquake, AFAD attempted to control the dynamics of who could and could not receive 
aid based on a number of factors, including organization, whether one rented or owned their 
home, and whether or not there was a male head of household (Schäfers 2014, Tamer n.d.). 
According to her review of the response by AFAD to the Van earthquake, the Soma mining 
disaster, and the influx of refugees into Suruç from Syria, AFAD has consistently taken up 
a hegemonic position in post-disaster relief, whether by explicitly pushing out civil society 
organizations in the cases of Van and Suruç or by disseminating a hegemonic narrative 
about the events as in the case of Soma (Tamer 2017). This would account for the 
comments made by my interviewees that they were feeling as though their role was being 
diminished and that it was increasingly difficult to work in the field as a civil society 
institution. What’s more, during interviews some of the disaster response professionals I 
spoke to specifically mentioned this dynamic with AFAD, where their organization was 
suppressed in comparison to the prioritization of AFAD by the state. Thus, tracing the 
research from the post-1999 earthquake era to the more recent research since AFAD was 
founded in 2009, it seems that while the state has taken on the responsibility for the post-
earthquake response in name, civil society organizations have been left out of this process 
in a significant manner.  
 
2.3. Scientists and the Negotiation of Responsibility 
 
When it came to the scientists and academics I spoke to, a key theme I encountered in my 
discussions with them was the idea that too much responsibility was being placed on them 
concerning the earthquake situation when it should instead be distributed to other actors. As 
a group who was assumed to hold key information about this threat, the interviewees who 
worked specifically on the science of earthquakes in some form or fashion occupied a key 
role in terms of providing information about this risk that would then inform both the 
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public and government policies. As such, many of them had been called on at some point in 
their career to speak to the media about the level of risk of a future earthquake in Istanbul. 
In this section, I argue that while the interviewees I spoke with fought against a 
displacement of responsibility solely to their shoulders (through the demand for a predicted 
“date” for the earthquake that preparation would then be based around), they also crafted a 
narrative about the probability and time frame of a possible earthquake in a way that 
informed the public about the limits of scientific knowledge just as it encouraged constant 
preparation in the city. At the same time, it seems that they also negotiated their position 
vis-a-vis state institutions in terms of what information they shared about a possible future 
earthquake. I also show how the scientists I spoke with enforced disciplinary boundaries 
against other researchers who have made predictions about when the earthquake will come 
in the Turkey-based and Istanbul-based media environments. 
 
Through the distribution of their comments to the media and the way their role as scientists 
was seen as authoritative in society, my research participants who specialized in earthquake 
science seemed very cautious and strategic about what statements they made to the media. 
For instance, when we discussed which areas of the city might be more vulnerable in an 
earthquake, Yavuz replied that he cannot use the names of specific districts when he is 
asked such a question by a reporter because it can cause “speculation.” He went on to say 
that he “gives some hints to people” - mentioning just various factors like distance from the 
faultline and soil quality. He gave the example of what would happen if he stated that, for 
instance, the northern neighborhood of Sarıyer was safe: Perhaps the soil quality and land 
under Sarıyer is “safe,” but they cannot be sure about the building quality. For this reason, 
he “cannot say anything.” This reply seemed to speak both to the way the media could 
cause an exaggerated reaction with the names of specific neighborhoods, and also how risk 
cannot be certain even in areas far from the faultline and with high-value housing. At the 
same time, the question may be raised as to whether Yavuz also did not want to cause 
“speculation” because precise predictions could affect the value of certain neighborhoods in 
terms of the real estate market. In turn, since there are close ties between land owners, 
construction companies, and the state, and since some scientists and academics have 
already been subjected to political pressure for making public statements that run against 
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the interests of the current government, he may have wanted to avoid precise predictions 
for certain areas for these reasons as well (Tamer 2017). As also noted by Tamer, due to the 
“fetish” for development currently at hand in terms of the approach to Istanbul city 
planning, it would conceivably run against the state’s interests if certain neighborhoods 
were devalued or overvalued depending on their construction plans (Tamer 2017).  
 
In addition, scientists I spoke with also criticized the pressure by the media to find a “date” 
for a possible future earthquake. For instance, Yavuz asserted that they as scientists are 
constantly asked by the media about “when” the earthquake will be, despite their repeated 
assertions that it cannot be predicted. He criticized those scientists who say “there will be 
no earthquake until 2045,” saying that their comments are not “meaningful.” Yavuz stated 
that it was very important to emphasize that the earthquake can potentially occur at any 
time, because if “you say that there will be no earthquake until 2045, it means for the 
normal people and the decision makers, you can sleep until 2044.”  
 
This particular situation in which earthquake scientists are confronted with demands for 
“prediction” was covered in the 2017 study conducted by Joffe et al. with earthquake 
scientists based mainly in the UK. The study was conducted to assess how the idea of 
prediction was understood and related to emotionally by scientists, especially in light of 
Italian scientists having been held legally responsible for their statements about the level of 
earthquake risk before the 2009 L’Aquila earthquake that struck and killed hundreds of 
people. While the conviction was eventually overturned, it has caused discussion within the 
scientific community about the nature of communicating risk and uncertainty to the public, 
and has moved scientists away from attempting earthquake “prediction” in general 
(Benessia & De Marchi 2017; Joffe et al. 2017). In the wake of this, Joffe et al. consider 
how earthquake prediction was popular for many decades in the late part of the 20th 
century, but after a string of high-profile failures in prediction, it quickly became a form of 
stigmatized research within the earthquake science community. Their article focuses on the 
ways in which science is not only guided by rationality but also group dynamics and the 
“dynamic interplay of cultural assumptions, emotion and social influence” in constructing 
boundaries and notions of stigmatized research topics, namely that an emotional and social 
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barrier against certain types of research is constructed around the idea of “stigma.” This 
demonstrates how scientific research is not guided by completely “rational” research 
questions but also by social dynamics and researchers’ emotional relationships to topics. 
Importantly, many of the comments and patterns that the researchers found for the U.K.-
based earthquake scientists were also espoused by my interviewees.  
 
In addition, Joffe et al. also observe the same tension that exists in Turkey between 
scientists and media in their own research in the UK, namely the “tension between the 
scientific dismissal of earthquake prediction and public interest and demand in it” (2017). 
For instance, Yavuz said saw a danger in giving specific time periods because their words 
as scientists would justify reduced preparation efforts by other actors. This was similar to 
Joffe et al.’s interviewees, many of whom stated that earthquake prediction is harmful 
because it takes the focus away from “creating resilient structures, which participants saw 
as the more pressing objective” (2017). Not only Yavuz but also several other professionals 
in my research  emphasized that the next big earthquake can come at “anytime” or 
“tomorrow.” For more than one professional I spoke with, these phrases almost seemed 
rehearsed, like they repeated them often. At the same time, more than one interviewee 
emphasized that they are not the “decision makers” in this situation, just as Yavuz 
expressed in the previous quote. I also interpreted this as a type of push-back to the 
responsibility placed on them, especially by the media, to offer guidance about what should 
be done in regards to the earthquake threat. By saying “decision makers” or “lawmakers,” 
besides several of them saying explicitly that it is now “the time for the decision makers [to 
act],” they highlighted through their word choice that they themselves were not the ones 
able to make decisions or make sweeping changes concerning these issues. They thus 
positioned themselves as public figures, but as figures that can only offer advice and 
knowledge from research; as noted previously, this may have also been a subtle message 
about their position in the preparation ecosystem vis-a-vis state institutions such as the 
greater municipality or country-wide institutions like AFAD that have executive power 
concerning these issues. 
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At the same time, these scientists had to strategically offer a narrative not that there was no 
earthquake threat at all (which would move too far away from prediction) but also that 
there is no way to predict a certain date with any reliability. By emphasizing that it can 
happen “anytime” or “tomorrow” just as it could possibly happen in 40 years, these 
interviewees kept the focus on the resilience of buildings through “forecasting” instead of 
“prediction,” since prediction is understood to be associated with shorter time windows 
while forecasting is more long-term. With forecasting, as Joffe et al. point out, not only do 
scientists avoid being “wrong,” which can be dangerous if there are too many false alarms 
through prediction and the public becomes immune to the warning, but the focus is kept on 
the idea that, no matter what, the earthquake will come at some point, and in fact it could be 
very soon. Thus, the earthquake scientists express what they understand from the 
probability of an earthquake occurring and at what general magnitude, just as they make 
sure to offer a narrative that leaves space for keeping “decision makers” accountable for 
their role in preparation. Joffe et al., in the conclusion of their article, encourage scientists 
to navigate this situation in the exact way that most of my interviewees spoke about the 
possibility: that it is important to “constantly maintain preparedness” even as scientists 
offer comments that downplay predictions made concerning exact years that may lack 
scientific credibility. 
 
As such, forecasting also seemed to be a reaction to the general environment in the Turkish 
media over many years past in which some scientists tell the news media contradictory 
claims about when, where and how a possible future earthquake may occur. Yavuz stated 
that media representatives had called him in the past to ask his opinion about the 
controversial claims made by other scientists; he told me that he responded by saying he 
can only comment on their claims after seeing their scientific methods and results. When I 
asked Vedat about the reports that could be seen from time to time saying that the 
earthquake will happen within a certain small time period, he dismissed the people who 
made those predictions as scientific frauds. He stated that they only speak to the media 
because they would be laughed at in scientific meetings: they have no “real record” of 
“scientific research,” and they are most likely going on TV and making such predictions for 
“publicity” and money. Through these responses, I read my interviewees as once again 
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reacting to the pressure placed on them as scientists to provide accurate and reliable 
information about this threat; this required not only speaking for themselves but also 
differentiating themselves from others in the scientific community. Joffe et al. also found 
that their interviewees made a large distinction between scientists who engaged in 
prediction research versus those who did not; they show that calling people who engage in 
prediction fraudulent or “nuts” is a form of boundary work:  
 
“...to maintain scientific authority, scientists routinely ‘police the boundaries’ 
between the scientific and the unscientific, attempting to stave off the intrusion of 
anything that may undermine its reputation. … A clear boundary was drawn 
between the ‘nut’ who pursued earthquake prediction, and the reasonable scientist 
who recognized the folly of this aim.” (2017) 
 
By highlighting that such boundary work was not emotionally neutral but in fact based on 
adding a sense of social stigma to the type of research they were trying to distance 
themselves from, Joffe et al. show that earthquake research is also about the steps taken by 
scientists to maintain their reputation as experts and “reputable” scientists through the 
domain of emotion as well.  
 
This point about boundary-work between scientists who engage in forecasting versus those 
who engage in prediction may be especially pertinent in the Turkish media environment. 
For example, Vedat referenced my status as American and noted that the Turkish media is 
not like the US media in that a specialist with an educational background in science is 
assigned as a science editor at many outlets. Instead, journalists that report on scientific 
issues in Turkey are just “ordinary” or “the main type of reporters,” who are more focused 
on a “sensational” story, as he put it. Here he was emphasizing that the media also could 
not differentiate between prediction and forecasting, and that scientists who were fraudulent 
(in his eyes) may not be able to be determined. However, it is also the case that there is a 
high level of media sensationalism concerning the earthquake risk level for Istanbul, and as 
my interviewees mention, they are asked to comment on the predictions of scientists who 
say things such as “the earthquake will come in 2045” or “the earthquake will never hit 
Istanbul.” Thus, the scientists I spoke with performed this boundary work often, not only in 
my interview as they discussed these topics but also in their comments to the media. This 
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may be more prominent, as Vedat suggested, in Turkey as compared to the UK or US as 
standards for media may differ.  
 
Overall, it seems to be the case that the scientists I interviewed performed boundary work 
to keep their own legitimacy as compared to other researchers just as they seemed to do this 
to keep their voice in the media about the results of their research. Simultaneously, as 
scientists who were also residents of Istanbul, they may have made sure to make scientific 
boundaries clear, while keeping the focus on preparation and action, due to their own stake 
in the future of the city. For instance, in the case of Yavuz, he later spoke to me in our 
interview about the worry he felt for his mother’s apartment, since he thought it was not 
safe enough in the event of an earthquake. This once again shows how researchers working 
on the issue of an earthquake in a different region or country may approach their work 
differently than the experts I spoke with, since they were simultaneously residents of the 
city as well.  
 
As one of Joffe et al.’s interviewees stated, as earthquake scientists they took their job very 
seriously because the information they provide will be passed on to the government and to 
the relevant social and political bodies. It was clear that my interviewees also took their role 
seriously in that they were able to craft and disseminate a narrative that both highlighted the 
inability to predict a certain year in which an earthquake would strike, while nevertheless 
making sure to state that an earthquake around 7.0 magnitude has a high likelihood of 
striking within the coming decades, and it will most likely greatly affect Istanbul. In the 
political context of Istanbul and Turkey, the scientists may have also been reacting to the 
encroachment of the state into the disaster planning process as mentioned by Schäfers and 
Tamer as well: as demonstrated in past recent disasters, non-governmental bodies such as 
civil society organizations and aid organizations have been put under pressure by the state, 
whether that be in their actions or public statements; as such, the form of neoliberalism I 
describe in this thesis is both based around disaster as well as an illiberal state that 
sometimes exerts control over academic and non-governmental bodies (Tamer n.d., 
Schäfers 2014, 2016). In this context, experts in this form of disaster neoliberalism needed 
to carefully strategize their public comments in light of influence from several different 
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parts of the Istanbul population, such as the media and the state, just as they needed to 
weigh their influence on individuals and state disaster management at the same time. As 
such they can be characterized as being under pressure but as noted in my interview 
comments, they negotiated this position a nuanced manner, just as UK scientists did in the 
Joffe et al. 2017 study, despite being in a more complicated and conflicted media and 
political environment than the scientists in the UK study.  
 
As I discuss in the beginning of Chapter 4, “risk” has been used in many senses, one 
predominant one being the way in which risk is made profitable. In this case, the scientists I 
spoke with did not seem to profit besides holding their paid positions. Instead, they took on 
the responsibility as Istanbul-based scientists to whom many questions were asked about 
the earthquake and crafted a strategic narrative that both fulfilled their duty as public 
intellectuals just as it resisted the push to place full responsibility on the scientific 
community for the earthquake situation. In doing this, they put focus back on other actors 
such as civil society, but also on the state, whose presence in the realm of disaster 
management was being felt even more strongly since the introduction of AFAD in 2009 
(Tamer 2017) They also worked against sensational predictions, which often create a short-
term sense of panic without accompanying information about how to prepare or what 
residents can do, and against sensationalism in the media in general. In this sense, the 
scientists I spoke with did a small part in helping to combat inaction within the city’s 
preparation efforts.  
 
2.4. Centralization of the State under Neoliberalism 
 
As discussed through the previous sections, the state has played a role in the actions of 
individuals and within civil society. This approach has been neoliberal in its partnership 
with capital and in its lack of support to individual citizens (much less non-citizens) 
regarding risk reduction. By ostracizing civil society groups that do not line up with the 
dominant politics of the party in power, the local and state governments hinder a section of 
organized society that would contribute to the earthquake preparations in the city.  
 
  
31 
One major observation about the role of the state in disaster preparation and risk reduction 
is its scale. For example, one interviewee, Dilek, said as much speaking about Turkey as a 
whole: “The key is government, governmental level. Because if you are talking about 80 
million [the estimated population of Turkey as a country], then you have to be, you have to 
be top authority to do everything.” Whereas civil society can only organize among 
themselves, the state also holds political authority, control of the criminal justice system, 
and the ability to regulate industries, all of which are not qualities of other relevant actors in 
the earthquake preparation field. They thus have a large role to play simply by being the 
largest actor and the actor with the most authority on this issue. However, as mentioned, 
one of the main and only laws concerning disaster preparation seems to benefit the 
construction industry and some property owners while marginalizing and de-possessing 
residents of their homes if they do not have legal ownership.  
 
It is intriguing that the particular combination of disaster preparedness, economy and the 
state have developed the way they have in Turkey, however, since a country with some 
similar elements, Sri Lanka, has a different combination of emphases in disaster 
preparation. Also a country vulnerable to a large future disaster and having suffered it own 
major disaster around 10-15 years ago (the 2004 tsunami that killed over 35,000), and also 
having a nationalistic and militaristic political environment, Sri Lanka’s government has 
paired together the ideas of disaster preparedness and nationalism through an idea of 
“securing” the nation against both disaster and terrorism (Choi 2015, 290). In Turkey, in 
general there is no rhetoric from the state that addresses the people as a whole and says that 
the nation must bind together in order to prepare for a possible earthquake, and they do not 
connect internal war efforts to disaster preparation as is done in Sri Lanka (Choi 2015). As 
demonstrated in the research done by Sumru Tamer, disasters are transformed into a 
national matter after they occur, not before: as she shows through the cases of the mine at 
Soma, which was sold to a private company and whose safety was not properly regulated, 
the state appeared on the scene in order to transform and manage the disaster as a scene of 
national mourning, not as one of state failure or as a “work murder” as it was labelled by 
the families of many miners killed (Tamer 2017). Moreover, in her work Tamer 
demonstrates that the particular form of nationalism displayed was about allegiance to a 
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“caring” state that “loved” its citizens, but only the citizens who also returned that “love” 
and who did not protest or criticize its response. Thus Choi’s usage of “disaster 
nationalism” seems to relate in the sense that the Turkish state also reacted with a push for 
“national unity,” but one that was not so much focused on pre-disaster, but on controlling 
the post-disaster environment both in who could participate - since civil society 
organizations and even individuals were blocked in the cases of Van, Suruç and Soma - and 
what the narrative about the event would be in the national media (Tamer 2017). 
 
At the same time, Tamer’s thesis is also very useful in contextualizing the role of AFAD in 
earthquake preparation. Since 2009, AFAD, in its consolidation of three other former 
government agencies, has been the main body through which the state has arranged its 
disaster preparation methods. Also as mentioned by Tamer, AFAD has published reports 
that promote itself as successful and strong in terms of what it is doing for disaster 
preparation in Istanbul (such as in the “National Earthquake and Strategy Plan 2012-2023” 
which outlines many goals but does not seem to have produced the urban planning risk 
reduction plans needed), but reactions from individuals and civil society differ when it 
comes to its actions “on the ground” (Tamer 2017). AFAD is indeed the institution that 
touts itself as having a central and top position in terms of disaster preparedness, since it 
operates under the office of the Presidency, and thus it operates on a national and even 
international level in terms of scale. However, with this being said, as in Tamer’s research, 
AFAD’s work, while partial, has left gaps in terms of pushing out some civil society 
organizations and monopolizing who can contribute in disaster preparation for a coming 
earthquake.  
 
Since the disaster preparation efforts before the earthquake occurs are not so much 
approached in a national perspective, like in Choi’s research on Sri Lanka, but in terms of 
post-disaster management, and since preparations are largely based on neoliberal 
developmentalism, for this thesis a more useful term may be “disaster neoliberalism” as 
opposed to “disaster nationalism.” Looking at the short-term history of the government’s 
approach, Gibson and Göksin point out that while the state developed reasonable plans for 
earthquake-focused risk reduction projects after the 1999 earthquake, “a rapidly growing 
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economy, faltering EU harmonization and a second term for an increasingly pro-
development government” meant that the state increasingly turned to destructive 
gentrification policies starting in 2005 to aid the economy and their image (2016). This 
push after the earthquake struck in 1999 was also important because the state received 
intense criticism not only due to its inadequate response, but for allowing the construction 
of so many poorly made buildings; during the Marmara event, many newly-constructed 
buildings fell, including state buildings like schools  (Jacoby & Özerdem 2008, 302-3). 
According to my interviewee, while government workers checked buildings before the 
1999 earthquake, this has now been changed to legally allow private companies to carry out 
checks as to whether design and construction of buildings is according to code. This is one 
reason why corruption has been criticized within the context of the Turkish construction 
industry and earthquake preparation (Green 2005; Gunduz & Önder 2013; Doig 2010). This 
creates an state of core uncertainty in terms of which buildings are truly safe, since even 
new buildings may not be safe if they are not built according to the updated legal building 
codes. 
 
Moreover, this collusion between the state and capital that defines the “disaster 
neoliberalism” approach may also partially account for why there has not been a new 
earthquake masterplan for the city since 2004, despite ambitious goals outlined in some of 
AFAD’s documents on disaster management. Despite the construction of a third bridge, 
several new metro lines, and two underwater transportation tunnels since 2009, the master 
plan for the city has not been updated, even though even the 2009 master plan did not 
include the recommendations from the 2004 earthquake plan. In addition, even though they 
are common in other high-risk cities, no comprehensive disaster risk reduction plan has 
been produced for Istanbul. In 2002, the Turkish government invited the Japanese 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to produce a report about earthquake risk levels 
in the city, but they have since not been invited back despite major construction projects 
and sealine changes. One interpretation of this lack may be due to the idea that creating and 
following a risk reduction plan would run counter to the profit logic of neoliberalism. As 
pointed out by Gibson & Göksin and Angell, the urban transformation projects that have 
been carried out are not in the areas most in need of assistance due to unsafety in an 
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earthquake (2016, 2014). Instead, projects are often criticized as being based on how 
lucrative they may be in terms of “rant” (or unearned income from development). At the 
same time, it is important to note that due to a lack of city-wide studies since the JICA 
study, the level of risk for various neighborhoods and areas is unclear or in the very least, 
difficult to easily ascertain for the average resident. Additionally, while AFAD has planned 
studies about the level of risk and while it states that it is now focused on risk management, 
it seems that this arm of the state has not produced the plans mentioned.  
 
In fact, Istanbul’s urban transformation as a phenomenon is not always touted as a solution 
to earthquake preparation; in many cases the earthquake threat is not even mentioned as 
reasoning for large-scale construction projects. For the ongoing Tarlabaşı 360 urban 
renewal project, earthquake safety - whether that the existing houses are unsafe or that the 
new houses will be safer - is barely mentioned in the promotional material for the project. 
The Tarlabaşı project was authorized around re-building the neighborhood due to its 
historical status, but at the same time, apartments such as the Tarlabaşı 360 building project 
promote gentrification by destroying the old homes and building expensive apartments in 
their place. For many such building projects, there is an embedded sense of anticipation as 
described by Adams et al. in their article about various functions and qualities of 
“anticipation” in the current moment. Commenting on how some affects of anticipation 
“[work] outwardly into multiple sites,” they say: “Promissory capital speculation and 
development logics render some places as backwards in time, needing anticipatory 
investment, while other places are deemed already at the cusp of the ‘new’ future, marked 
by the virtue of rapid change” (2009, 251). Such omissions of the topic of earthquake safety 
- when they may even be relevant for very old neighborhoods like Tarlabaşı where 
buildings sometimes collapse on their own without any earthquake movement - belie the 
most pressing reason for urban transformation, mainly the acquisition of wealth for the 
representatives of the state-capital partnership. At the same time, such urban transformation 
projects utilize a narrative of speed, modernity, and moving towards a “new” future through 
gentrification and renewal. The excitement that is conjured around such a vision of a future 
based on development seems to contrast with the possible future of the large-scale 
earthquake; it is missing in many of these gentrification projects, even in their promotional 
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materials. The affect of looming danger that the earthquake represents clashes with the 
visions of prosperity, growth and modernity that projects like Tarlabaşı 360 advertise.  
 
2.4.1. Effects and Implications 
 
Marlene Schäfers, in her analysis of the 2011 Van earthquake and the response by the state, 
analyzes the rhetoric of state officials and shows how the state contradicts itself as to the 
safety of the buildings post-earthquake. At first, they say that they can only assess current 
damage to the buildings through inspections, then than ones that are less than “heavily 
damaged” can be re-entered - thus making a claim about their future safety as well (2016, 
237-8). In essence, she shows how the state avoided responsibility not only for the initial 
earthquake but also its aftershocks (through their announcement that people could move 
back into buildings, after which 39 people died in the aftershocks) by claiming that the 
situation was beyond their responsibility as it was a “natural” event (2016, 238). She details 
the way in which the state contradicts itself and fails to follow logic in its explanations for 
its own processes. This seems to be one example in which the Turkish state has failed to 
take responsibility for its own actions concerning earthquake preparation and response. In 
Istanbul today, while AFAD exists as the main governmental body, its presence does not 
seem to be widely felt in terms of specific information about neighborhood risk levels, 
comprehensive risk reduction plans, or wide-scale public outreach on this issue; since 
AFAD exists and takes up a large amount of official “space” in opposition to civil society 
organizations, but since they seem to be less effective in their output than promised, this 
seems to also create disempowerment among individuals. This goes hand in hand with the 
lack of information about the risk level for various buildings, neighborhoods, and regions. 
This dearth of information results in uncertainty about how risky various parts of the city 
are, which in turn prevents political organization around demands for safer housing or 
earthquake meeting points. As stated, the central government, through AFAD and other 
means, has also hindered sections of civil society based on their political alignment, and 
under the state of emergency especially, this has led to thousands of associations being 
closed. The groups closed were organizations of many different types and purposes, but 
such actions, among others, have led to the particular style of government to be deemed 
  
36 
oppressive and as following “authoritarian patterns of government” (Akçalı & Korkut 
2015; Günay & Dzihic 2016; Eraydin & Taşan-Kok 2013). Several interviewees who gave 
political critiques about the current political environment also asserted that there was 
corruption in the building industry just as they said that the state is oppressive towards 
dissenting voices and opposition politics. 
 
Returning again to the points emphasized by Tamer and Schäfers, it seems that the state, 
through AFAD, seemingly suppresses other non-governmental actors while trying to 
monopolize pre-disaster preparations. At the same time, many interviewees said that AFAD 
was not effectively taking part in pre-disaster activities - whether that was corruption in the 
retrofitting process, corruption in educational activities for neighborhoods, or corruption in 
terms of having programs existing only “on paper” and not on the ground - the state seems 
to be working to restructure the disaster preparation field. Through this AFAD 
monopolization, the current field is changing in terms of who could participate if the 
earthquake struck soon, and how they could participate. As it stands, the earthquake 
preparations may be seen as a continuum, where the state’s response to other disasters such 
as Soma and Van can be seen as foreshadowing to how it may respond to a large Istanbul 
disaster. While the state was cited by many sources as being unprepared and slow following 
the 1999 earthquake, in the last decade since AFAD’s construction, even though it was still 
cited as being slow, it can be seen to have exerted more illiberal control over which civil 
society organizations can operate, even using violence and the police to enforce these goals 
as in the case of Suruç (Tamer 2017). 
 
Seen in this light, Naomi Klein’s thesis of “disaster capitalism,” as explored in the cases of 
post-war Iraq and post-Katrina New Orleans, among others, may be relevant as a guide to 
the current state of the disaster management environment in Istanbul. As also outlined by 
Tamer, it is crucial to take note of the links between private companies and the state, since 
these would most likely be the companies favored for post-disaster reconstruction contracts 
(n.d.). According to Klein, disasters create voids in the realm of economics and politics that 
allow the state and private companies to come in and restructure the areas affected by 
disasters while ordinary citizens and local civil society organizations are still reeling from 
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the effects of the disaster. She sees private capital not only as a partner to the state in this 
kind of process but as something that is aimed to replace the state: “This [disaster-
capitalism] complex is not satisfied merely to feed off the state, the way traditional military 
contractors do; it aims, ultimately, to replace core functions of government with its own 
profitable enterprises, as it did in Baghdad's Green Zone” (Klein 2007, 50). While it is not 
clear what the exact balance of state bodies to private enterprises may result after a large 
Istanbul disaster, Klein’s point highlights the way in which less powerful actors like civil 
society organizations are potentially more powerless after a large disaster due to their 
smaller structure pre-disaster. And while many non-governmental agencies took the 
opportunity to grow and build their organizations in the wake of the 1999 earthquake, after 
which the state response was slow, due to the formation of AFAD and its previous 
examples of post-disaster control, it seems that the current field has become more subject to 
control by AFAD as a centralized state institution. The structure of the state thus seems to 
have changed since 1999 in terms of how disasters have been managed in the last several 
years and how disasters are currently being prepared for (Tamer 2017). 
 
As for the overall landscape, the mode of “disaster neoliberalism” seems to often shift the 
responsibility for preparation onto individuals regardless of their financial means, and it 
refuses to work cooperatively with all civil society organizations, opting instead to 
politicize the preparation efforts by non-governmental groups and prioritize those with 
ideological alignment. Both of these factors are ways in which the Turkish government, 
through AFAD and at various levels, contributed to an environment in which many people 
did not prepare for the earthquake. In the middle of these various actors, the scientists I 
interviewed also negotiated the burden of responsibility that was sometimes placed on them 
to provide “answers” about the nature of the risk, but through their narrative they made sure 
to emphasize the importance of focusing on comprehensive disaster risk reduction. While 
the state has made some efforts in the way of getting the city ready through AFAD and 
other mechanisms, the strategy of “preparation through urban transformation” seems to 
have left large portions of the city at risk despite the state’s possible post-disaster plans.   
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Chapter 3 
 
Humor as a Response to Risk 
 
For all natural disasters, it impossible to clearly state the level of risk that may be at play 
for particular cities or areas. For one, there are variables to all weather and earthquake 
events that cannot be exactly predicted; groups can only forecast various scenarios based on 
different possible factors. For earthquakes, as discussed, their exact timing cannot be said 
for sure, except for some phenomena such as aftershocks occurring after a large earthquake 
event. Furthermore, earthquakes in particular are very much predicated on the type of 
physical structures people have built, thus making them especially dangerous for 
compactly-built urban areas. Without knowing about the status of the buildings and 
infrastructure, the general level of earthquake risk for cities cannot be clearly known. 
Earthquakes are unpredictable events and are thus inherently uncertain, and at the same 
time, due to some factors outlined in the previous chapter such as a lack of a recent city-
wide survey, the earthquake risk situation in Istanbul is especially uncertain.  
 
At the same time, many of my interviewees spoke about political problems they faced, and 
they discussed the risks and limits of the current political situation. Thus the concepts of 
facing physical risk from the earthquake itself sometimes coincided with commentary about 
living with political risk in an environment that was both politically uncertain and 
potentially oppressive to those who did not have the favor of the current government. Since 
some of my interviewees expressed such views, the concept of physical risk and political 
risk seemed to overlap and result in an environment that contained uncertainty in multiple 
domains of life as an Istanbul resident. In this chapter, I discuss humor and laughter as a 
reaction to this uncertain situation. Laughter and deliberate humor often overlapped in my 
interviews, and in this chapter I evaluate both. Especially in terms of how this humourous 
response may be interpreted politically, I refer to three sources based on ethnography that 
concerns the political dimensions of humor and laughter: Susanna Trnka’s 2011 work on 
the Indo-Fijian response to the 2000 coup, Victoria Bernal’s 2013 article about Ethiopians’ 
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responses to political repression, and Yael Navaro-Yashin’s 2002 book on the role of 
humor, rumor and cynicism in mid-90’s Istanbul. 
 
3.1. Humor as a Response to Both Physical and Political Risk 
 
When reflecting on the interviews I conducted as a whole, I realized that almost every 
interview contained some sort of humor or laughter. This can partially be explained by my 
own methodological approach, as many times I encouraged a light-hearted or joking 
atmosphere in the interviews: if my interviewees made a joke I laughed with them, and on 
one or two instances I made my own jokes with them after they made a joke as well. Since 
one of the functions of humor is bonding, this was one way in which I attempted to go 
along with the atmosphere that was being created by my interviewees, or to make my 
interviewees feel more comfortable. Upon listening to my interview recordings, I also 
realized that I laughed nervously specifically when the idea of the earthquake happening 
very soon was discussed. 
 
However, despite this approach on my part, the amount of jokes or laughter in my interview 
seemed striking. In her article about the response of the Indo-Fijian community following 
the 2000 coup in Fiji, Susanna Trnka questions why humor was the predominant reaction of 
many people in the community. Referencing the theory that the impetus for laughing and 
humor comes from “the perception or recognition of incongruity,” she states that such a 
response would be understandable from the discord, confusion and political and social 
uncertainty that followed the coup (Kuipers 2008, 363). However, she wonders why such a 
response was common instead of “expressions of fear or despair” or “critical analysis” 
(Trnka 2011, 339).  
 
Since my interview topic concerned a potentially disastrous event and took place in an 
uncertain political and physical environment, some parallels exist with Trnka’s field in the 
sense that the environment contained tension, confusion and ambiguity. In the same way, 
my interviewees often responded with laughter and joking tones when discussing the 
earthquake threat and the current political situation in Turkey. For instance, I wrote 
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“laughs” for almost every instance in which I or my interviewee laughed in the interviews; 
this word appears 375 times in total in my transcriptions. Thus Trnka’s question about the 
prevalence of a humorous response also seems relevant for my field as well, since other 
emotional expressions like fear, sadness, or anger could have been more dominant.  
 
In her analysis, Trnka says that “joke-work” is about a mastery of control in a situation in 
which one feels helpless. Trnka references Freud’s theories on humor, showing that humor 
can come as a response to the uncanny, and in Freud’s description a sense of uncanniness 
can itself come from feeling helpless. Despite being a reaction to feeling powerless, 
however, Trnka posits that joke-work is a type of narrative and emotional construction that 
demonstrates agency and control through the process of creating the joke itself. In regards 
to my field, as I will also cover in the fourth chapter, the current environment in Istanbul 
sometimes leaves few options for people to act, both in regards to the political risk and 
physical risk. Thus, this explanation of joke creation may be useful to understanding why 
humor was so common in my interactions in the field. 
 
Another interpretation comes by way of Victoria Bernal, who in her work on the use of 
humor as a response to Eritrean state politics, states that joking may “open up a way to talk 
about the unspeakable,” and that the shift from “tragic” to “comic” in situations of 
repression creates an “analytical distance” (2013, 307). In a related fashion, I take humor as 
opening up an emotional distance from the topic - whether it be the earthquake threat or the 
current political conditions, it may have been more difficult or not preferable for my 
interviewees to show strong emotions regarding these topics in the interview setting. 
Instead, humor and laughter allow one to speak about difficult subjects without a heavy 
emotional investment or a taxing emotional expression. This may also speak to the 
performance of being an expert or professional, as emotional regulation and seeming “in 
control” while being interviewed may have played a role in the general lack of strong 
emotional expressions. 
 
Relatedly, many scholars of humor also note that jokes and laughter function as a way to 
relieve tension or strain, or to even function as “catharsis” (Kuipers 2008, 367). Quoting 
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Mary Douglas, Trnka provides the following except from her work that explains this as a 
psychological mechanism:  
 
At all times we are expending energy in monitoring our subconscious so as to 
ensure that our conscious perceptions come through a filtering control. The joke, 
because it breaks down the control, gives the monitoring system a holiday, . . . For a 
moment the unconscious is allowed to bubble up without restraint, hence the sense 
of enjoyment and freedom. (Douglas 1968, 364; Trnka 2011, 339)  
 
This quote refers to the tension or strain caused by one’s own self-monitoring processes, 
but the idea of relieving tension has also been applied to social processes: for instance, 
humorous rituals of reversal that poke fun at the powerful act as a “safety valve” to release 
the strain that accumulates between people or groups across a social hierarchy (Kuipers 
2008, 365). In the context of my interviews, I often brought up questions that might recall 
negative feelings, such as what they imagine the aftermath of a possible earthquake might 
look like, and we also discussed issues in earthquake preparations as they were brought up 
that may have sparked frustration, anger, fear, or despair. Responding with humor or 
laughter may have been a way to sidestep or even replace possible reactions that may have 
been more negative or more emotional, thus relieving or avoiding tension. This may be 
something that my interviewees do in their daily lives if they are frequently dealing with 
and discussing the earthquake threat, and thus it may have served to help understand how 
the people I interviewed inhabit their job in the sense of daily life, or it may have been 
something that resulted from our interview setting since I asked many questions directly 
about the earthquake threat and its implications. 
 
In either case, the usage of humor and laughing as a response seems worthy of review for 
its significant instances, and its possible interpretations and relevance. I will first consider 
the responses I received from my interviewees that seemed to pertain to the idea of physical 
risk, such as what will happen during or after a possible large earthquake, and then in the 
second section I will evaluate the humor and laughter that pertained more to political 
conditions. However, since both types of risk were related to one another, the explanations 
for humor may apply to both forms of risk. In both sections, I will also ask the question of 
the effect of such humorous reactions on political action: whether responding in a joking 
manner seemed to help develop political agency or whether it seemed to suppress it.  
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3.1.1 Responding to the idea of physical risk 
 
When my interviewees spoke about physical risk, humor seemed to function as a way to 
provide emotional distance and to cope with the tension of discussing situations that may 
involve possible death or injury. For instance, when I asked Dilek, who worked for a civil 
society organizations, whether she avoided any areas of the city, she told me that she does 
limit her time in some buildings that she thinks are not very safe, like some malls or movie 
theatres:  
 
“Sometimes you have to accept [the risk]. Because in some cinema salons they don't 
have proper setting for it. And you have to accept that fact. But I need, I just try to 
be, let's say, close to the door, when I see somewhere like that, if I can't escape 
(laughs), so (laughs) if something is going to happen, I want to be- (laughs)” 
 
I said “yeah,” to her in agreement at that point, since we were both laughing and she 
seemed to be reiterating that she wanted to be somewhere safer, like near a door, in the 
event of an emergency. Dilek further talked about the need to prioritize making Istanbul 
buildings safer by demolishing and rebuilding unsafe structures before focusing on training 
about disaster response. She stated this as a critique of the government’s prioritization of 
post-disaster training, saying: “First of all, [building renewal] needs to be done, and then 
give training to those people. If you just give trainings, then, they will die.. (laughs) as a 
trained person (laughs a bit but sadly).” 
 
In her summary about the sociology of humor, Kuipers says that “black or sick humor, for 
instance in disaster jokes, has often been explained as a way to cope with unpleasant 
experiences, both individually and collectively, and more generally to distance oneself from 
negative emotions such as fear, grief, or shame” (2008, 367). In terms of my own personal 
participation on this topic, I experienced each interview multiple times: first I was 
physically present in the interview, then I listened to the interview and transcribed it, 
sometimes listening to or reading certain sections multiple times depending on their 
significance. In this process, I realized that my reaction as to whether I found something 
funny changed. I remarked in my notes that while I had laughed nervously at many of the 
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same things my interviewees laughed about - namely at the immediate threat of dying or 
the threat of the earthquake happening in the near future - I did not feel the impulse to laugh 
when I was transcribing or when I was re-reading the transcripts. In fact, I found the sound 
of my own laughter on the recording a bit jarring and I found myself to be more nervous 
and fearful about the earthquake threat during the interview than when I was transcribing. I 
believe that part of this is due to my own level of fear about the earthquake changing back 
and forth over time, but I also think this difference in emotion hinged on the distance 
inherent in listening and transcribing. With the added distance of the transcription, instead 
of laughing or finding something funny and then quickly passing over it to the next point or 
interview question, I had more time to contemplate and dwell on what was being said. At 
this time, I discovered that those negative emotions like fear, sadness and anger tended to 
crop up when listening or re-reading the interviews, as I had more time as well as physical 
and emotional space to react to the content: namely, that countless people will be in danger 
if disaster preparation is not dramatically improved. 
 
This anecdote about my research process is small, but it seems to speak to the way in which 
a humorous response can replace and substitute for more intense negative emotions, or 
even for “critical analysis” as Trnka noted to be lacking in the emphasis on responding with 
humor (2011). The short-term relief of laughing about a serious topic in the interview 
seemed to serve as a stop-gap for the critical reflection that I was able to access more easily 
in dealing with listening to, typing up and reading the interview content. It follows, then, 
that this temporary relieving of tension through humor may distract Istanbulites from 
reflecting more deeply and feeling more intense emotions -- in essence, through 
confronting these uncertain situations in a more engaged and long-term way that in turn 
may lend itself more easily to future political action. The phrase “laughing it off” may be 
apt in describing this particular way in which people who may be affected by the 
earthquake situation pass over this situation emotionally through the use of humor.  
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3.1.2. Responding to the Idea of Political Risk 
 
As previously noted, since physical and political risk overlap and reinforce one another in 
my field, the responses to such risk resemble one another as well. In the context of an 
environment that has been described as increasingly authoritarian, it seems more and more 
relevant to discuss how much my interviewees felt in control versus how much they felt 
immobilized or helpless. Many instances occurred in my research in which “joke-work” 
seemed to be a reaction when discussing situations that interviewees described as being out 
of their personal control. I particularly found that the most common time in which my 
interviewees laughed was when they discussed part of their job, the earthquake 
preparations, the government or their lives that they could not change. For instance, 
Hüseyin, who works in a university, said that he was not able to do all the things he wanted 
to do about earthquake preparation due to his current level of work obligations, saying: 
“Unfortunately I can't do so many things. I have to do much more. But it's not getting 
further than talking with my students in lectures, courses, or in some meetings. I - I can do 
more than this, I have to do, but I cannot now. (laughs)” 
 
Similarly, Dilek laughed at many different topics that represented limits or blocks as to 
what can currently be done right now concerning the earthquake preparations. She laughed 
at the money her organization does not get, at the slow pace of Istanbul’s disaster 
preparations, at the lack of infrastructural support for other areas of Turkey that need 
earthquake training, and at her organization’s lack of ability to make any infrastructural 
changes to the city (since they only helped in training people for earthquake response, as in 
the comment cited previously about “dying as a trained person”), among other topics that 
were similarly about blocks or limits. This seems to speak to Bernal’s observation that 
some experiences of deep disappointment may seem “maudlin or exaggerated” if expressed 
in direct emotional terms instead of through laughing (2013:307). Speaking about the ways 
in which Eritreans resist the state through humor, for instance, she explains that humor acts 
as a way to confront political and tragic truths without facing them head-on: “some 
circumstances....need to be examined obliquely through the corner of the eye” (2013:307). 
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Describing Donna Goldstein’s ethnography in Rio de Janeiro’s shantytowns, Bernal notes 
that humor in her fieldwork acted as a “response to a moral and legal system that is 
currently incapable of addressing . . . grievances” and that it is a response to “fear and 
bewilderment” (Goldstein 2003, 272; Bernal 2013, 301). Two of my interviewees offered 
critiques of the state both directly and through humor. Fear and bewilderment most likely 
factored into some interviews, but in the case of the two people who used satire, one person 
made these jokes alongside showing anger at how the earthquake preparations were being 
handled by the state and by the current party. He mocked the notion that other countries 
were “jealous” of Turkey by pointing out that other countries are conducting space 
missions and advancing in topics such as stem cell research. Another interviewee whose 
jokes accompanied critiques of the state said the following about how he believes that the 
park near where we met would be built over at some point for real estate development:  
 
Osman: So they will come here for a hotel. Because park means- park costs you 
money. But you need to earn money, you know?  
Laura: (laughs a bit) Yeah, exactly. 
Osman: Uh, you will profit- so, sell it! To where, I don't know, some company 
(laughs shortly). People will uh, resist, probably, and they'll get detained, charged as 
a terrorist, (I laugh) because they're defending the land, like happened in Gezi Park 
protests. 
 
In both interviews in which such humorous remarks were made, my laughter signaled my 
agreement with the essential logic of the joke, and as such it had a cohesive function, one 
that Bernal notes is important under politically oppressive environments, since “getting the 
joke” indicates a shared history and knowledge of the political circumstances and one’s 
position within them (2013, 307).  
 
Finally, since humor is often linked to recognizing incongruities or breaks in logic, it seems 
especially fitting for oppressive and neoliberal environments in which conditions of 
bureaucracy, inequality, and corruption created illogical or confusing systems. For 
example, one interviewee who generally tried to portray the earthquake preparations as 
going okay explained the entire process of auditing and checking building designs and 
construction before I brought up the flaw in this system; namely, that the people 
  
46 
responsible for overseeing the design and construction can be directly related to the 
company and can be unqualified:  
 
Filiz: So. Yeah. The application [of the building construction] should be the same 
with, with the [building] plans.  
Laura: Right. So originally, this is the ideal case. But these inspection firms, private 
inspection firms, are opened by... the owners of the construction firms. (we both 
laugh) 
 
This interviewee later stated that since this flaw exists, she finds the process “meaningless.” 
In trying to understand why laughter and joking was so popular after the Fijian coup on the 
part of the ethnic group that was most under threat, Trnka states that by invoking humor 
and laughter, one actually refers back to an essential orderliness: the joke itself may 
construct a sense of respite, relief, or “liberation” from narrative order and rules, but at “the 
conclusion of the joke, … there is a return to a sense of orderliness” (2011, 341). In 
situations of disorder and incongruity, “jokes not only push beyond existing social norms 
but also, in doing so, implicitly suggest that such a set of relations exist and that there are 
limits to how incongruous life can be” (2011, 341). By laughing together at the 
“meaningless[ness]” of an entire system designed to audit construction without an 
objective, outside auditor, such a joke may have helped to remind us that we do, as 
observers of this system, understand this logic as flawed and inherently contradictory. This 
is especially relevant in political environments in which a state “produces dominant 
discourses that overdetermine representations of reality” (Bernal 2013, 304) and as such, 
these jokes once again create a sense of solidarity and in-group feeling among those who 
fail to accept the logic of these processes enacted by the government. 
 
The topic of whether humor can serve as an effective strategy or type of response against 
oppressive conditions has been debated within the literature on humor and its effects. 
Kuipers describes satirical jokes against the government under oppressive regimes as 
having the purpose of “boosting morale” amongst those who make the joke, and also 
possibly having an effect against the powerful group that is the target of the humor. 
However, one important distinction in the cases she covers seems to be whether such jokes 
can be public or whether they are “whispered” (2008, 368-9). Unfortunately, most of the 
jokes in my interviews seemed to be made with the assurance that all my interviewees 
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would be completely anonymous, and in my field there seems to be a decrease in the 
amount of public jokes that are made about the political system, even though some jokes 
and forms of satire are present, especially online. Thus this lack of widespread satirical 
humor about politics seemed to indicate that such jokes were not currently being made in a 
way that disrupted the political order, but rather seemed to be cowed by it, at least partially. 
This also seemed to also be a comment on how effective this type of joking and humor can 
be in making change, especially since humor may allow Istanbul residents to “laugh off” 
uncomfortable realities.  
 
Another possible interpretation of the use of humor and laughter covered here comes by the 
way of anthropologist Yael Navaro-Yashin, whose book Faces of the State: Secularism and 
Public Life in Turkey was written based on fieldwork conducted in the mid-1990s in 
Istanbul. While two decades have passed since the era written about in the book transpired, 
her observations first about humor and rumor on the part of Istanbul secularists may be 
useful as well as her observations about cynicism as a dominant mode of relationship to the 
state. Concerning her argument about humor and rumor, in the book Navaro-Yashin shows 
how humorous texts and exaggerated jokes circulated after the victory of the Welfare Party 
in Istanbul, whose win was both unexpected and feared by securists, who were panicked 
about how their secular lifestyle might change after the electoral win. Quoting Walter 
Benjamin, Navaro-Yashin states that “the domain of humor and rumor reflects discursive 
knowledge in the form of ‘flashes’ [per Walter Benjamin] … the jokes and the gossip are 
like glimpses of ‘memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger” (2002, 23). Such a 
domain is important for anthropological analysis because “humor and rumor reveal an 
unconscious precipitation of remembered discursive form in the present” (23).  
 
In one exchange I had with Dilek, she made a joke that living in Istanbul, with its 15 
million residents, was like “sitting on a bomb”; we laughed at that and she followed by 
saying, “it’s going to explode, you know that.” In Navaro-Yashin’s reading, discourses of 
humor are triggered by anxiety about one’s own position as well as one’s feared visions 
about the future. In her field, humor and rumor served to solidify already-existing 
narratives for secularists about what Islamist political dominance might look like for them. 
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In my research, regarding Dilek’s comment as an example, humor and laughter also seemed 
to reflect anxieties just as they repeated and amplified certain discourses. Dilek’s comment 
seemed to reflect an anxiety about the damage that would potentially be wrought by a large 
earthquake, but at the same time, her comments also frequently referred to excessive human 
population as problematic; she also referred in negative terms to some forms of 
immigration into Istanbul. Thus her comment about a “bomb” going off in Istanbul also 
seemed to reference commonly-held ideas about “population bombs,” or the idea that 
population itself is or will be its own environmental disaster; these ideas were pushed by 
Paul Ehrlich in his 1968 book The Population Bomb. Such theories have been refuted as 
placing too much emphasis on the number of people as opposed to the distribution of 
resources, but in any case Dilek’s joke about this topic seemed to connect to both a fear of 
an earthquake as well as an already-established discourse about other possible “disasters” in 
the future.  
 
Navaro-Yashin’s other main theorization on humor, laughter and politics through her 
ethnography concerns the idea of cynicism, specially as used by Slajov Zizek and Peter 
Sloterdijk. As this idea speaks to both the idea of inaction and complacency as it does 
humor, it will be explored more in-depth in the next chapter, but her commentary on 
cynicism overall also provides an alternative political reading of the function of laughter 
when it comes to “things one cannot change” and powerlessness. In Navaro-Yashin’s take 
on many Istanbul residents in the 1990s, although they were aware that the Turkish state 
was not real “as such,” they acted as though the state was indeed “real.” She defines this as 
cynicism, since residents were aware that the state they were supporting was not “real,” but 
they still persisted in holding onto this idea. Navaro-Yashin compares this phenomenon of 
holding onto one’s symptom in psychoanalysis, which has been summed up by the phrase, 
“They know what they are doing, but still they do it” (2002, 186). In this reading, Navaro-
Yashin states that instead of organizing concrete political action or being direct in political 
critique about a certain topic, Istanbul residents whose primary mode of relation to the state 
was cynicism, or a general acceptance and acquiescence to the way things were already. 
Quoting Zizek, “laughter and irony” are “part of the game” in regards to cynicism, as is 
perhaps a type of “chic bitterness” about the current conditions. While this corresponds 
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more closely to my interviewees’ comments about “Turkish culture” covered in Chapter 4, 
this reading may also be applied to the laughing comments that my interviewees made at 
certain points. 
 
I have already quoted many instances in which interviewees laughed about things they were 
not able to accomplish: these did not seem to fall under the umbrella of cynicism since they 
seemed to be comments about things they intended to do in the future if possible, but were 
not able to as of yet (as opposed to a put-on attitude of hopelessness with no intention of 
action). Instead, the interpretation given by Donna Goldstein that laughter can be a 
response to an oppressive set of conditions or to “a moral and legal system that is currently 
incapable of addressing . . . grievances” seems more apropos in thoses cases, such as when 
Dilek and Hüseyin spoke about the projects they were not yet able to take up. However, in 
the example already quoted with Filiz, both of us laughed when I brought up the flaws in 
the building regulation procedures she had been describing. This seemed to be a closer 
example of knowing and behaving (“they know what they do”) about the incongruities in a 
system but still supporting this system anyways (“but still they do it”). As a final note on 
this point concerning cynicism, one point Navaro-Yashin makes repeatedly is that material 
conditions support her object of study, in this case, the state. It is not just cynical behavior 
about the state that ensures its continuation but also the ways in which it is ingrained in our 
material worlds and the ways in which “refusing to play the game” are also punished. Thus 
when experts may support the general logic of flawed systems, this may also point to the 
systems of repurcussions that punish those who do not “play the game,” especially in an 
illiberal environment that may target scientists and academics.  
 
Overall, through this analysis of humor I argue that laughter and joking may represent a 
key manner of coping or “dealing with” the earthquake risk as it was confronted by my 
interviewees in our interview setting. It may also speak to how the experts I spoke with 
coped with this threat in their daily lives, since they needed to address this issue in their 
jobs quite frequently, if not every day in some form. Thus I also argue that laughter or 
trying to put an emotional distance between the topic may show that as interviewees who 
were at once experts and Istanbul residents, there may have been strain inherent in facing 
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the issue of the earthquake head-on. However, by diverting emotional reactions with jokes, 
this may have also skipped over more “critical analysis” at times, as Trnka also points out 
(2011). The prevalence of joking and laughter also speaks to the key theme of this thesis, 
namely that my interviewees may have felt powerless or incapacitated and may have 
reacted with laughter as a result, and furthermore that laughing may have indicated the 
ways in which my interviewees must fight against feelings of fear and anxiety in their daily 
jobs. While according to some theories this use of laughter and humor may have boosted 
morale and in-group feeling, in the light of theories of cynicism it may have alternatively 
propped up the flawed systems it was a part of by refusing to challenge them directly. In 
these ways, humor and laughter seemed to serve as a type of release valve in some 
situations, but stopping such negative emotions through laughter may not have had a 
positive effect overall in terms of cultivating a “critical analysis” or more direct 
confrontations about the current state of affairs in disaster preparation in the city.   
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Chapter 4 
 
Encountering Inaction 
 
In many studies that address the possibility of a future earthquake in Istanbul, much focus 
is given to the way in which the earthquake represents a risk that is then used as a narrative 
to change the city through urban transformation and gentrification. Although the risk is for 
some point in the future - and for the earthquake, according to predictions, most likely 
sometime in the coming decades - urban transformation and wide-scale construction is 
something that is affecting communities in the present day. In many cases, even in studies 
that state that the urban renewal efforts are effective in reducing risk, such as the one by 
Özlem Güzey, argue that the transformation is simultaneously hurting some residents of the 
city through gentrification (2016). Much of the literature on risk also focuses on the ways 
in which discussion on risk may create a “culture of fear” in which risks that are not as 
legitimate as others are promoted for the financial profit of some groups: as stated by Engin 
Isin, in the “culture of fear” concept, “society is asked to invest in practices that, 
statistically speaking, constitute much lower risks while those genuinely high risks are 
made trivial, mundane and routine” (2003, 219). While he criticizes the “culture of fear” 
thesis, he does show that many of these ideas about risk in the literature are based upon a 
hierarchy of risk: some risks are real and some risks are less “real,” as he writes in 
quotations. Risk is inherently impossible to pin down definitively, but nevertheless it seems 
that various risks are constantly ranked according to how dangerous or likely they are. In 
the case of the Istanbul earthquake risk, much of the literature has focused on how “the 
earthquake” becomes a form of rhetoric while the actions taken in its name do not seem to 
always follow what should be done if such a risk is taken seriously. 
 
However, in my research, while noting how risk has been employed as the justification for 
many changes in the urban landscape, I also focus on how this risk seemed to be impacting 
my interviewees. Far from being treated just as a rhetorical idea, many people in my field 
took the idea of a future Istanbul earthquake very seriously, both as experts or activists who 
worked on this issue and as residents who could be affected by it in the future. Although 
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the reactions to the threat of an earthquake varied widely, one that recurred many times was 
a sense of anxiety and a lack of action; this lack of action and a sense of helplessness has 
also been noted in some of the literature on disaster preparation in Istanbul (Eraybar et al. 
2010; Karanci 2013; Tekeli-Yeşil et al. 2010a). Thus I will discuss in the first section how 
risk did not seem productive (in a financial sense) for many of my research participants, but 
rather it only produced affects of nervousness and inaction. As the theme of the chapter, I 
will discuss how my interviewees spoke about their encounters with inaction and how they 
seemed to regard themselves and the people close to them when it came to preparing (or not 
preparing) for this possible disaster. In the final section, I will consider inaction in a 
different light, this time focusing on the way in which narratives about “Turkish culture” as 
an explanation for inaction may be tied to the concept of “cynicism” explored in the 
previous chapter, and may inhibit disaster preparations overall. 
 
4.1. Risk as Productive for Whom? 
 
In much of the literature on risk, risk is taken as a concept that can become “productive” 
(Zaloom 2004). In the case of Zaloom’s research, she observed in her field site of the 
Chicago Board of Trade, a global futures exchange, that risk was mobilized and 
incorporated into the identities and selves of traders working on the floor of the Chicago 
Board of Trade, and that it was made financially productive through speculation. For 
Vivian Choi, the anticipation of a future disaster in Sri Lanka has been the impetus to re-
structure not only the way the state managed disaster risk, but also how they have 
strategized against Tamil forces (Choi 2015, 289). In the neoliberal criticism of the concept 
of risk, it is shown how the idea of risk aids many industries that capitalize on risk 
management: for instance, insurance of all kinds hinges on making risk profitable. And, as 
Choi’s work shows, the narrative of preparing for a future event through “risk 
management” can be a powerful narrative by which many domains of life are restructured, 
including state policy.  
 
In terms of Istanbul’s disaster risk regarding earthquakes, risk is made profitable through 
the state-run mandatory earthquake insurance fund, the housing and apartment complexes 
  
53 
that advertise themselves as ready for an earthquake, and through the examinations 
performed by private firms that ascertain whether a building is earthquake-ready. As 
discussed previously, the justification for the urban transformation building projects derives 
from the narrative of preparing for a possible large earthquake, through both the state-run 
TOKİ and private firms. Thus, this logic of neoliberal risk serves as the justification for 
such wide-scale changes, and for the laws that allow the state to designate disaster-prone 
areas for renewal (Saraçoǧlu & Demirtaş-Milz 2014; Adanalı 2013).  
 
The question arises, then, of for whom exactly such risk is productive. Homeowners and 
people who possess legal property rights to their apartment may benefit from the 2012 
Disaster Law that allows them to receive a new home and rental assistance while their old 
home is being demolished. But for those without formal property rights or for those who 
live outside of neighborhoods with high property values, risk does not seem productive or 
profitable. For people without sufficient financial means, they cannot not take advantage of 
construction laws to their benefit, and for renters or those who did not have a say in these 
processes, they actually were disadvantaged; in many cases renters or people without 
property documents are, in effect, forcibly displaced by these construction processes. 
 
At many points in my research, I talked to friends and acquaintances about my research 
topic. By merely stating that I was researching the earthquake preparations in the city, I 
brought up the idea of the possible future earthquake threat in general. Thus I often had 
conversations with people in which they said, “Oh yes, the earthquake!” and spoke about 
their own home, their workplace, or what they were or were not doing about the threat. 
Quite frequently, people made jokes or brought up the fact that they were not doing very 
much to prepare, if anything at all. Some parallels can be drawn here with the type of 
cynicism that Yael Navaro-Yashin described in her ethnography about how people 
understood exactly how the state was not “real” but instead made jokes or accepted the 
situation as it was without taking direct action. As discussed in the previous chapter, such 
jokes may have indeed was substituted for action or “critical analysis” as theorized by 
Trnka.  
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This lack of preparation on the part of many people in my environment contrasted with the 
people I interviewed, who were professionals on this topic. However, since three of my 
“expert” interviewees had not prepared an earthquake kit, they also shared something in 
common with the people who said they had done nothing to prepare. It should also be noted 
that many people in my social circle are students like myself and are almost always renters. 
They are not planning or considering buying a house in the future or investing in 
retrofitting for an apartment they do not own. Thus this anecdote about the field is skewed 
towards a certain income type and towards people who rent, if not even sublet from renters. 
However, even with this being said, many people in my social circle also had not conducted 
non-structural hazard mitigation or prepared an earthquake kit; they reacted with 
nervousness and humor about this situation. 
 
Following Foucault’s concept of governmentality in his approach to risk, Engin Isin states 
in his conception of the “neurotic citizen” that, under new forms of power in our current 
era, the citizen as a subject is forced to govern itself “through responses to anxieties and 
uncertainties” that are not completely rational but instead based on affect and emotion 
(2004, 223). Since I also encountered many instances in which people expressed to me that 
they felt anxious and uncertain about the earthquake risk, it seemed as though Isin was 
correct to incorporate an analysis of affect into how individuals approach the many risks 
that exist in the present day. For these people, risk was not productive in a financial sense. 
Instead, it was productive in the sense of conjuring an affect of anxiety and nervousness. 
This often coincided with a lack of action. Thus, if anything, risk only seemed to produce 
anxiety, not profit; it affected people individually and on the level of emotions. 
 
For people who could not move or who did not have knowledge about preparedness 
measures, the risk of a strong earthquake happening soon was not productive in the same 
sense of “the earthquake” as an overarching narrative that justifies large-scale construction 
projects or the re-creation of the cityscape. Instead, in many cases, risk did not produce 
anything but fearful emotions and inaction: the term inaction here can refer to many 
residents’ financial inability or refusal to physically change houses. At the same time, it can 
  
55 
indicate a sense of powerlessness and lack of preparatory action, even concerning smaller 
tasks like preparing an earthquake kit. 
 
In their study conducted in the Avcılar and Bakırköy neighborhoods of Istanbul, Eraybar et 
al. show that, of the 865 residents they surveyed, approximately 50% did not have a plan 
for a safer house despite their geographical region being one of the most high-risk in the 
city (2010, 90). They also found that “the vast majority of respondents [did] not plan to 
implement relatively simple measures such as the purchase of an insurance policy, engage 
in awareness-raising within the family and among neighbors, and secure the safety of non-
structural elements” (2010, 87). In another study that evaluated both the resources needed 
for Istanbul residents to prepare alongside the qualities that may prevent action, Karanci 
found that “helplessness, fatalism, denial and externalisation of responsibility (i.e. belief 
that mitigation and preparedness is the responsibility of local or central government 
institutions)” were factors that seemed to hinder preparation (2013). In Tekeli-Yeşil et al., it 
was found that “location, direct personal experience, a higher education level, and social 
interaction” promoted preparatory actions for an earthquake while “outcome expectancy, 
helplessness, a low socioeconomic level, a culture of negligence, a lack of trust, onset 
time/poor predictability, and normalisation bias inhibit individuals in this process” (2010a). 
While all three studies focused on different neighborhoods, elements of the situation and 
factors that affected various groups, I would like to focus on the lack of action that the 
authors found in the behavior of the Istanbulites they surveyed and spoke with. 
 
In many ways, Istanbul is similar to other areas that are at risk of natural disasters but 
whose residents generally do not prepare for such events; as one example, FEMA in the US 
found that “nearly 60 percent of American adults have not practiced what to do in a disaster 
by participating in a disaster drill or preparedness exercise at work, school, or home in the 
past year” despite 80% of Americans living in a county that has been affected by a disaster 
since 2007 (fema.gov). This general trend and its relevance for Istanbul is important to note 
if only to emphasize that the “productivity” potential of disasters seems to be related to the 
relative level of power of groups. While individuals are not preparing, corporations and the 
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state are able through their economic and political power to turn this earthquake risk into a 
profitable phenomenon. 
 
In the next section, I address how my interviewees, as people who were generally more 
informed, knowledgeable and prepared than the general population, related to the people 
close to them; in particular I focus on how they encountered the inaction of people close to 
them and what this may say about their position as disaster experts.  
 
4.2. Interviewees’ Encounters with Inaction 
 
Since the people I interviewed were typically invested in preparing for the earthquake in 
part due to their professional work on the issue, many of them were active in spreading 
information and knowledge about what one can do to prepare for a possible earthquake. For 
instance, when I asked Emre whether he had an earthquake kit at home, he replied that 
since he and his wife had just moved, they still needed to prepare the kit for their new 
home. While mentioning that he had sent his wife a list of items that needed to be in the 
bag, he also noted that she had forwarded this information to their friends through text and 
had told them to also prepare a bag for their own homes.  
 
Similarly, two female interviewees I talked to were the ones who had taken responsibility 
for making their family’s earthquake kit, conducting training drills, and deciding on the 
emergency meeting points for their families. When I asked Dilek about her family’s 
reaction to her organization of these efforts, she said that they were “ready” due to having 
experienced the two earthquakes in 1999. She mentioned that she didn’t have to “force 
them” to participate in the drills and preparation efforts that she organized for them as a 
family - they accepted this “voluntarily.” When I spoke to Filiz, she also said that she was 
the one who organized the preparation efforts for her household:  
 
Filiz: All my furnitures are attached to the wall, to the columns... well, it's a new 
building, and then I... follow all the precautions, steps for my house. And even my 
family - my kids, my husband, they are aware of the earthquake, and sometimes I 
simply do some, um- simulations? “Okay, the earthquake!” I just shout, and the 
people- 
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Laura: Yeah.  
Filiz: -I follow them. If they run, or if they just sit and wait for the earthquakes, and 
yeah. 
 
Filiz also informed me that she advises her neighbors on how to secure their furniture and 
other non-structural hazards that could become dangerous in an earthquake when she visits 
their homes. She also advises friends and relatives about which homes are safe for them to 
buy when they are considering moving homes.  
 
Both when discussing her relatives and neighbors she emphasized that they take her advice. 
For both Dilek and Filiz, I did not ask directly if their family or friends listened to them on 
these matters; they volunteered this information themselves, and in Filiz’s case she sounded 
happy that her family and friends were doing what she recommended. On one hand, this 
seems to indicate how important it was for many of my interviewees to pass along the 
knowledge they had gained about the earthquake risk, and how the people close to them 
could take immediate steps to protect themselves. This went above and beyond their 
professional roles and showed that they in fact used their expert knowledge and their 
concern about this issue to assist others, and to protect themselves and their “loved ones” as 
Dilek phrased it when discussing this matter. On the other hand, it was also interesting that 
both Filiz and Dilek specifically noted that their advice was followed; this may be 
interpreted as comments made in a context in which many people do not prepare their 
houses or attempt to move to safer homes, and thus my interviewees were happy to see that 
the people they had given this important information to ended up taking it and performing 
actions to prepare instead of reacting with the “helplessness” that has been found in studies 
on Istanbul preparation.  
 
In contrast, earthquake professionals like Emre, Filiz and Dilek can specifically be 
construed as being more active in the face of such disaster risk, as opposed to being more 
inactive. When I spoke to Dilek about the members of her family, she mentioned that she 
lived with her mother and that her mother also took part in the tasks. I asked who made the 
earthquake kit in her house, her or her mother, and she answered that she usually told her 
mother what to do, and then her mother followed her advice. She said that it was known in 
her family that she was more “detailed” and that her family knows about the threat because 
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she “keeps telling them” about information she has learned in trainings she has attended. 
Especially for Filiz and Dilek as women and members of a household, they were the ones 
who took on the organizational labor of planning and executing preparation efforts. Dilek’s 
family may have been “ready” to accept these preparation efforts but they were started 
through her initiative; it sounds similar for Filiz’s case as well. This fits the general trend of 
women as the ones who take on the burden of doing the labor required to prepare against 
earthquake risks and disaster risks in general (Mulilis 1999). In Dilek’s case, she also 
laughed a bit after she said that her family knows because she “keeps telling them” about 
the different steps that can be taken to prepare, which can be interpreted as showing that her 
position in the family as the one responsible for such safety action and knowledge was 
quite clear. However, it of course cannot be said that it is a rule that the adult woman in a 
household is automatically the person who takes on this type of labor. When we were 
discussing her mother, Dilek specifically called her approach “inactive” in comparison to 
hers; while her mother went along with what she asked her to do, it was Dilek who 
educated herself and put in the effort of organizing and arranging preparation activities for 
the house.  
 
While Filiz and Dilek expressed stories about the ease with which they were able to have 
their friends, family and neighbors follow their advice about what action they should take, 
Yavuz spoke to me about the difficulties he faced in trying to get his mother to leave her 
current apartment, as he thought it was unsafe. He said that his mother valued being able to 
easily socialize with her friends and her current apartment is near many transportation lines, 
thus making it easier for her to reach her friends, so her “priority” was different than his, 
since she did not want to move and give up this access to her social life despite the 
apartment being unsafe in Yavuz’ eyes. Since he has been working on the earthquake issue 
for several years, I asked him if this had been going on for a while, and he said yes. He has 
been trying to get her to move to someplace more safe for some time, but they could not 
find a house within their family’s budget. Yavuz specifically mentioned that he felt “afraid 
for her a bit” and he emphasized that he would be much more “happy” if she would move. 
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My interviewee Gülser was the most emotive and expressive on this subject when it came 
to the issue of people who do not prepare. She was very frustrated about this issue in 
general, and I spoke to her about it both before the interview and during the recording. She 
said that she had highly educated friends, but many of them did nothing to prepare for the 
earthquake. She recounted that some of them had been in the coastal area of Bodrum this 
past summer (in 2017), and that they had called her in alarm after experiencing the smaller 
earthquakes that had struck the region during that time. After her friends recounted their 
surprise to her, she said to them: “I told you!” She also expressed the following to me:  
 
Gülser: This is a dilemma: Why? I mean, an educate... for instance, my friend 
graduated from university. Yani [that is], I mean, they are educated, but not 
educated about earthquake, but they are graduated from university and they know 
many things, political and economical, everything. But they don't care [about the] 
earthquake.  
Laura: What do they say, do they say anything?  
Gülser: They don't know, they don't care, they're not interested in this subject. (hits 
table for emphasis) Interesting, çok [very] interesting!  
 
Gülser, when I brought up this lack of action or even a sense of helplessness, 
enthusiastically said that one does not need to wait for the government to do something but 
rather, anyone can do something through their own initiative. In this way, it reinforces once 
again that several interviewees were very proactive and self-motivated to take the action 
they had learned about, and that they took steps to inform others about this information as 
well. They were the ones to pass on knowledge and to encourage others to start to 
undertake some kind of preparation as well. 
 
At the same time, the presence of this personal initiative and the organizational labor that 
my interviewees undertook to help their family and friends be informed and take action 
also seemed to set them apart socially and perhaps affectively as well. With Gülser 
especially, it can be seen that she approached the earthquake risk in a different manner than 
her social circle: whereas she advocated being proactive, they preferred to ignore the issue 
and ignore her advice. This made her frustrated and caused her to question this topic 
intellectually as well, as she told me. When her friends called her in shock about the 
earthquake they’d experienced in Bodrum, she made fun of their surprise to me, most likely 
because she had performed emotional labor in trying to get them to take action about this 
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issue and stress its importance for quite some time, and it took them experiencing an 
earthquake themselves to finally acknowledge her labor, knowledge, and concern. 
 
Although the context differs greatly, the way in which my interviewees differed from some 
people in their social surroundings in terms of their orientation towards risk is reminiscent 
of Sara Ahmed’s approach to theorizing how affect works within groups. Her work 
typically focuses on the way in which marginalized and minority people, their bodies, and 
their accompanying affects function within, for example, heteronormative spaces or 
majority-white educational institutions (Ahmed 2010, 2012). This is clearly not the case for 
my field as this thesis focuses on approaches and orientations towards risk and action, and 
importantly on experts who are generally privileged in several regards. Despite this 
difference, though, two associations may be made: first, the way in which my interviewees 
necessarily brought up the topic of the earthquake and what Istanbulites should do to 
prepare in their social world through their status as earthquake professionals and through 
the ways in which they often brought this up outside of their professional life, as some of 
my interviewees told me. It should be noted that when one brings up this threat in Istanbul, 
to residents of Istanbul, it can inspire feelings of fear or anxiety concerning the possibility 
of such a potentially destructive and harmful disaster. In the same way, I experienced 
reactions of fear and anxiety when mentioning my research, and encountered anxious 
responses from people and replies that they had not prepared. In this way, my interviews 
and myself sometimes appeared as “affect aliens”: as Ahmed describes them, “affect aliens 
are those who are alienated by virtue of how they are affected by the world or how they 
affect others in the world” (2010, 164). In this case, my interviewees sometimes appeared 
as affect aliens to the people close to them through their status as experts on the earthquake, 
as people who raised the threat of the earthquake and encouraged an approach of awareness 
and preparation. They thus experienced alienation from the dominant affects of many 
people in Istanbul: namely, ignorance (which may or may not be “bliss”), the pushing away 
and subsequent denial of anxiety and fear, and/or a refusal to prepare.  
 
In addition, Navaro-Yashin’s analysis of cynicism as a dominant affective response in 
Istanbul seems pertinent here. Navaro-Yashin states that, at the time of her fieldwork, 
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“mundane cynicism” was the most popular mode, but some activist groups who regularly 
gathered, organized and protested, such as the Saturday Mothers who gathered every week 
to call attention to their missing relatives, fell outside this cynical mode (2002, 170). Within 
the two groups I analyze here, my interviewees and the people close to them, my 
interviewees also seemed to fall outside this particular form of cynicism, since they actively 
worked to address the earthquake threat. On the other hand, some of the responses my 
interviewees described and many of the responses I encountered in the city seemed to echo 
Navaro-Yashin’s quote from someone who was cynical and aware of this fact: “We have 
accepted the situation as it is; we have become indifferent” (2002, 175). This may be 
relevant when combined with Ahmed’s description of encounters between people with 
different affective dispositions.  
 
In her work, Ahmed uses “affect alien” to describe several different types of affective 
situations, but one main figure she analyzes is the “melancholic migrant”: the migrant of 
color who holds on to their feelings regarding experiences of racism and feelings of non-
belonging in the dominant community (such as the white U.K. population), the feelings of 
whom then disturb the majority, who react against this nonconformity. It’s implied that the 
majority also does not like this because they are implicitly made aware of their country’s 
history and their own complicity with this racism. Ahmed also notes that one reason for 
becoming an affect alien can be “consciousness of racism” since this causes one’s 
emotional reactions to break off from the dominant mood: she cites an example of Yasmin 
Hai’s memoir, who writes that she realized that her emotional reaction to the Iraq and 
Afghanistan wars after 9/11 was not in line with the majority affects of excitement, since 
she had recently become aware of the power dynamics between Britain and its Muslim 
migrants (2010, 157).  
 
This figure who disturbs the dominant mood through their consciousness may also apply to 
my interviewees, who, through their profession and knowledge, brought up the spectre of 
the earthquake to people who would perhaps remain ignorant or unaware of this situation. 
In another figure that Ahmed employs, the “feminist killjoy,” the feminist points out 
instances of sexism - that already existed in the environment although it may be ignored or 
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denied - and subsequently gets blamed for being the origin of bad feeling, even though the 
feminist killjoy was pointing out something already present and causing bad feeling. 
Ahmed notes that many such affective dynamics in groups revolve around the conversion 
of emotion. By bringing up something that was suppressed or ignored, the affect alien or 
feminist killjoy converts happiness into disturbance or sadness. In the same way, my 
interviewees converted happiness (perhaps as in the “bliss” of ignorance) into anxiety or 
fear about the earthquake situation. Just as sexism was also already present, the earthquake 
situation has been present in the city for many decades and remains a problem today that 
often goes unaddressed. Navaro-Yashin’s idea of cynical residents of Istanbul may also be 
comparable: the cynic is someone who is psychoanalytically wedded to their “symptom.” 
In this case, the “symptom” that they are aware of is their knowledge that a large 
earthquake would be dangerous, but they take no action to confront this situation or 
acknowledge the problem. In this encounter between the expert or activist and the cynic, 
the expert or activist is the one who confronts their “symptom” and decides to dismantle 
cynical self-deception. That the cynic reacts in a dismissive, unconcerned or even mocking 
way to the activist seems more clear when read through the figure of the affect alien or the 
feminist killjoy. Navaro-Yashin defined the mode of cynicism as the dominant affect in her 
fieldwork, and as such the activist affect alien or kill joy falls outside this majority mode of 
relating to one’s environment.  
 
Following this logic, it also seemed to make my interviewees happy when their raising of 
the earthquake threat did not inspire a conversion of feeling into something negative, or 
into denial: when Filiz talked about her friends and neighbors taking her advice about 
preparations, she seemed pleased and happy that she was not met with resistance to her 
recommendations and information. On the other hand, Yavuz said he was prevented from 
being “much more” happy if he could only succeed in getting his mother to prioritize the 
earthquake risk as he did. There was a mismatch in affect, it seems, as his happiness was 
prevented from being fulfilled through his mother’s actions, which failed to prioritize the 
earthquake threat as he did. 
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In addition, Dilek talked about her family being “ready” to prepare, but she also had to 
perform the organizational and emotional labor needed to help her family conduct drills and 
create kits. She also seemed content with the fact that her family went along with her 
preparations, but she emphasized her own activeness regarding this situation while she 
called her mother’s stance “inactive.” In this manner, I argue that there is a second type of 
conversion going on: namely, that while one type of conversion is the transformation of 
“good” feeling into “bad” (nervous) feeling, another is a personal transformation from 
nervousness, fear, and anxiety into action. My interviewees expressed fear and anxiety 
about the earthquake threat at times, but importantly, through their jobs they took initiative 
to help in preparation efforts. As mentioned, a significant number of interviewees made 
earthquake preparation not only their profession but also their hobby, volunteer work, or 
second job; they also spoke to their friends, family, neighbors, and sometimes the media 
about the threat.  
 
Thus it seems as though my interviewees may be set apart from the dominant response to 
the earthquake threat by nature of their own determination and activeness in confronting 
this problem head-on in many ways. This contrasts with many people who feel nervous or 
scared about the disaster threat but fail to convert this feeling into action, or, following 
Navaro-Yashin’s formulation, cynics who refuse to confront their own lack of action. 
However, this still does once again make these interviewees affect aliens: when Dilek 
spoke about herself in regards to her family and preparation, she often differentiated herself 
by emphasizing that she was the more detailed, rational and prepared member of the family 
who organized their emergency response. Her different emotional role was especially clear 
when she described what this dynamic was like during the 1999 earthquake, which her 
family experienced together at their apartment in Istanbul when she was a preteen: 
 
“Back then I was just a kid, but I was aware of the fact that earthquakes is a part of 
Turkey, because we received some trainings at school. But as I already said, they 
were not enough. But, compared to have nothing (laughs a bit), we have some 
certain things. Uh, I felt a bit surprised, but, uh, I don't know. I wasn't very shocked. 
I wasn't let's say, affected just like my mom. My mom affected very badly and my 
brothers affected. They were affected very badly but I wasn't affected like them. 
And, because I was a bit prepared against the earthquakes, so I was actually, it's a 
part of my personality. Uh, I'm a bit (laugh) cold-heart person, so it's a bit difficult 
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for me to, let's say, get excited in terms of any emergency, yeah? I was the cool one. 
But not my family.” 
 
She went on to describe that she followed the correct procedures she had learned in school 
in terms of stopping her family from panicking during the earthquake, and then led them 
outside after the shaking was over. When she uses the term “cold-heart person” I assume 
she is referring to how she remained “cool” under pressure, as she said, using her 
preparation knowledge, as opposed to her family’s panicked response. This remarkable 
story also seemed to show to me the dedication and long-term history that many experts I 
spoke with had when it came to the earthquake issue, as many were affected by the 1999 
and continued on to work in preparedness or research as a profession, as Dilek also went on 
to do. 
 
Interestingly Yavuz also shared a similar story of having a different kind of affect than his 
family during the 1999 earthquake:  
 
Yavuz: Because when the 1999 earthquake, during the occurrence of the 1999 
earthquake, we were living in a - with my wife, there were no child at that time, so 
we were living in the sixth floor of a fifteen-floor apartment. Six floor. So when the 
earthquake happening- there was a quite... strong... effect of the earthquake, and 
then while we were shaking - so, I mean, I was thinking about, "I hope, I hope the 
Marmara is broken now."  
Laura: I see.  
Yavuz: I was thinking about that, "I hope the Marmara is broken now." So it means, 
if the Marmara was broken at that time, we will - uh, have no more earthquake 
during the next 100 years. So I was thinking about this. (I laugh a bit) So this is the 
difference between the people who are dealing with the earthquake and the normal 
people; my wife was.. uh, having a- she was scaring, and then she was screaming, 
“Oh, woahahah, what are we going to do!” - I was thinking about, oh, okay (he 
pauses and laughs) - this is the difference. 
 
Interestingly, in the two examples above, Dilek and Yavuz actually show a kind of calm 
and distance during the events themselves. Both characterize themselves as more 
emotionally distant and calm while the building was shaking, and they talk about being 
focused on the science of the earthquake or on what current training says one should do 
during an earthquake.  
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As noted by anthropologist Dominic Boyer, experts are not just “rational(ist) creatures of 
expertise” but rather “desiring, relating, doubting, anxious, contentious, affective … 
human-subjects” (2008, 38). By pointing out how my interviewees talked about their 
encounters with people close to them who refused to prepare or who were inactive, I show 
that, even though they are “experts,” emotions and affect played a role in how they saw 
themselves and how they approach the current state of preparation in the city. Some were 
happy that their push for preparation was met without resistance, some were upset when 
family would not follow their advice, and some were frustrated with friends who didn’t 
seem to heed their warnings. In characterizing them as a type of “affect alien,” it shows that 
affects apply not only to issues of racial, national, and gendered dynamics, but also to 
situations of risk and disaster. In Istanbul, since ignorance, denial and inaction are so 
common, the “experts” on this topic stood apart from the majority not only in their level of 
knowledge and their level of activeness in preparation, but also in their emotional stance. 
 
In addition, only through thinking of them in this way did I realize how my interviewees 
also spoke of themselves as “other” from the people close to them due to their own level of 
knowledge about the tectonic plates or about correct emergency response. As such, it may 
be important for the study of expertise to consider how the amount of knowledge and the 
subsequent motivation to prepare can make these professionals feel alienated from those 
close to them. While I did not discuss this in-depth with my interviewees, when also 
considering how they needed to navigate speaking about the threat to the public despite 
ignorance, how they pushed to be able to continue their civil society organization’s 
activities under increased pressure, and how they also needed to convince people around 
them about this risk, it paints a picture of conditions that may sometimes feel quite 
alienating indeed. Future research and ethnographic studies may need to be done in order to 
understand more how this self-perception as affectively different, and these emotions 
regarding encounters with immobility affect “experts” both as people and as professionals 
in their work on preparation.  
 
 
 
  
66 
4.3. Cultural Essentialism as Encouraging Inaction 
 
While one form of inaction that I and my interviewees seemed to have encountered in the 
field was a lack of preparation, on the other hand, many people stated the same reason for 
why there was a general lack of preparatory action: it was due to “Turkish culture.” This 
discussion came up in several of my interviews unprompted as the reasoning for why many 
people did not prepare for the earthquake, just as it was offered for other elements of the 
earthquake readiness situation, such as corruption in building practices and why some 
scientists would give misleading answers about when an earthquake may occur. As such, 
cultural essentialism seemed to encourage inaction, as it seemed to refer to an essential 
characteristic of “Turkish people” that was static and thus unable to change. While this was 
a sense in which the “experts” I was interviewing engaged with me on the topic of culture, I 
present a critical view of how “culture” was used in terms of its possible negative effects on 
Istanbul earthquake preparation. I argue that this conceptualization of “Turkish people” as 
inherently fatalistic and passive in regards to the earthquake threat is problematic for two 
reasons: for one because it may obscure the political, economic or historical factors that 
may inhibit preparation efforts (although some interviewees explicitly noted some of these 
factors), and secondly because it may inhibit change and political mobility through its 
essentialism. In addition, such self-identifications also seemed to be problematic because 
they supported static, national self-conceptions based on Turkey’s relation to “the West,” 
and as such they may be brought into conversation with Meltem Ahıska’s (2003) concept 
of Occidentalism as well as Ayşe Gül Altınay’s (2004) analysis of how culture was used as 
a rationalization of militarization in Turkish history in The Myth of the Military Nation. As 
to why it may have been so prevalent in my fieldwork, I refer again to Navaro-Yashin’s 
conceptualization of cynicism. While her work discusses the Turkish state and these 
comments were made in relation to “Turkish culture,” many parallels may be drawn.   
 
In her work on the topic of earthquake preparation, Angell also found that people often told 
her that Turkish people are “naturally fatalistic” and that this was given as an explanation 
for “failures in preparedness” (2014, 673). This explanation came up in my interviews in 
different ways. Just as Angell states, “Turkish culture” was often associated with fatalism 
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by my interviewees; this has been cited in previous studies about earthquakes in Turkey. 
For instance, Jacoby and Özerdem use the 2003 study performed by Kasapoğlu and Ecevit, 
to state that more than half of the survivors of the 1999 earthquake who they surveyed had 
not taken any steps to prepare for a future earthquake, and of those respondents, 13% 
“explained their 
inaction  in  terms  of  the  fatalistic  passivity  frequently  ascribed  to  Muslim  society” 
(2008). My exchange with Yavuz on this topic covered this idea. He said that failing to 
prepare was part of Turkish culture, and I told him that I had also heard that idea and that I 
was wondering about his opinion. He replied in this manner:  
 
Yavuz: It's a cultural thing.  
Laura: Cultural thing.  
Yavuz: Yeah, it's a cultural. It's a - Middle East- 
Laura: Middle East?  
Yavuz: Yeah I mean, Middle Eastern or East European culture, I think. 
 
A minute later in our conversation he said the following, after stating that German and 
Japanese people are not like Turkish people: 
 
Yavuz: Mostly the German... yeah yeah, the Germans are much more strict. And the 
Japanese also. I know this, this too, I have visited most of the world, but I know 
these people are much more sensitive- let's say, about the coming danger, or risk- 
about risk. You know, we say- maybe you have heard the Turkish word inşallah, 
maşallah, Allah saklısın, God bless us, you know? (laughing a bit) We have some 
kinds of, you know, the most of the people dealing with the religion, they are - 
saying, God bless us, yeah yeah, that's the main problem.  
Laura: Mhm. Do you think it affects the preparations?  
Yavuz: It affects the preparations- yeah, of course, sure. Because people, people, 
some of the people think it's coming from the God.  
 
He then went on to state that such reliance on fate or God wasn’t “meaningful” because 
“everyone should be ready.” He also said that it was “Turkish” to say what people wanted 
to hear: as an example, he said that some scientists are stating that an earthquake will not 
happen for at least 40-50 years, because this makes them “one of the best scientists” 
(because, according to his explanation, such statements then allow people to abdicate their 
responsibility to prepare until that time). This statement differed slightly from the general 
comments that I heard, and that Angell also encountered, for instance, that “Turks are 
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essentially fatalistic (kaderci)” in that he said it was about expressing ideas that other 
people “wanted to hear” (2014, 673).  
 
When I spoke with Hüseyin about this idea of “Turkish people” or “Turkish culture,” as he 
had brought up, he identified fatalism as a way of thinking that is present in “Islamic 
societies.” When I mentioned people I knew who were not doing anything to prepare, he 
said their “priorities or [their] way of thinking may be different,” bringing up kadercilik as 
a term. He stated: “They say, if it's written on my forehead, I have nothing to do,” going on 
to state in Turkish the same phrase. I had brought up the phrase “yapacak bir şey yok” 
earlier in the interview as a common statement made in Turkish in which one says that 
there is “nothing to be done” about a situation. In the Turkish phrase, he incorporated this 
saying of “yapacak bir şey yok”: Hüseyin said “if you have something written on your 
forehead, there is nothing to be done,” in this case meaning because it has already been 
determined by God. This was interesting because I had brought the phrase “nothing to be 
done,” which is not inherently religious, and he combined it with the idea of fate. Hüseyin 
went on to state that “most people think” in this way. I asked if it was also something that 
he thought secularist people did, and he said yes, that many of his secularist friends also 
thought in this fatalistic way. He then said that “it has become a culture.” Thus he theorized 
Turkish culture as having been affected by this religious idea, and gave his own account of 
how religiosity or professed belief in secularism did not affect who could potentially hold 
such an idea. 
 
In the case of Gülser, when she brought up the idea of Turkish culture, she also mentioned 
“Mediterranean culture.” I asked her more about this: she said that in Izmir, people were 
more “well-educated,” while in the eastern part of Turkey, they were not, although she was 
quick to clarify that this was “not their fault” and that the government needed to offer them 
more “education.” She had mentioned “Turkish culture” when we discussed people who 
failed to prepare at all for the earthquake as well as contractors and inspectors who took 
bribes or failed to follow construction and building codes. Thus she seemed to connect 
“culture” to an idea of access to education; throughout the interview she stressed that such 
behaviors (which were due to culture) could be changed through education, training, and 
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awareness-raising. Gülser formulated culture not only as national, but also as regional, 
since she also described “Eastern,” “Turkish,” “Mediterranean,” and regional cultures 
within the boundaries of Turkey, which can also possibly be read as ethnic designations, 
since referring to the “East” of Turkey often implies Kurdishness, although this was not 
stated as such. It should also be noted that Gülser is the same person who was frustrated 
with her highly-educated friends for refusing to prepare, and as such she herself pointed out 
the contradiction of using education to ensure that people prepare within Turkey.  
 
However, Gülser’s regionalization was more specific than other interviewees, who 
mentioned “Turkish” culture or “Eastern” and “Middle Eastern” culture. In the case of 
Hüseyin, he said that the reason why many earthquake meeting points have been covered 
up with shopping centers and buildings is due to something in the “cells of the Turkish 
people”: 
 
“Look like this to your question. In Istanbul, the price of the land is very high, you 
know. And- I think it's in the, in our cells, in the cells of the Turkish people, I don't 
know. We can forget everything, very easy. So we cannot give the right attention to 
the subjects. It's a very important, very big problem for us. Anybody asks to me the 
hugest problem of the Istanbul, I say: ‘Earthquake.’ Most of them say: ‘Traffic.’ No, 
earthquake. (laughs)” 
 
While this quote connects to the previous discussion on failure to take action, it also reveals 
a way in which Hüseyin describes the behavior of people in Turkey: as something rooted in 
their “cells.” I later brought up this comment and I asked him why he thought Turkish 
people may be the way he described. He then replied by referencing, for instance, the way 
that Turkish entertainment media keeps people distracted from other issues, saying that this 
has been going on for “thirty to forty years.” Thus he offered differing backgrounds for 
how culture might come about: while his first comment had a background that implied 
biological and nationalist essentialism (“the cells of the Turkish people”) he then made a 
more political critique and set a defined time frame for this effect when I asked him for 
elaboration on this idea. 
 
In his article “Cultural Essentialism and Cultural Anxiety,” Ralph Grillo examines common 
usages of the concept of culture both within the discipline of anthropology and in public 
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discourse (2003). Citing authors such as Ulf Hannerz and Unni Wikan, Grillo shows that 
there exists a tension between anthropologists and the public in how the world “culture” is 
used and what it means, especially since anthropologists have moved away from more 
bounded and static notions of culture and towards “dynamic, anti-essentialist” notions such 
as those of Homi Bhabha’s, whose notion treats culture as a site of contestation and flux 
(2003, 160). However, despite anthropologists changing their understanding of this concept 
to something more open and “dynamic,” the “old,” bounded and static interpretation is 
more popular in the public understanding (2003). In my research, my discussions with these 
experts on culture reflected this difference, just as my interviewees gave their own 
interpretations and understanding that did sometimes go along with a slightly more 
dynamic understanding of culture. As can be seen in Hüseyin’s response, he states that 
fatalism became divorced from its religious context and became something more 
widespread in Turkish culture. When I asked my interviewees questions about this notion 
of Turkish culture, I also asked them to engage in a discussion about the nature of culture in 
a way that showed that I was then sharing a particular realm of expertise with them in a 
form of para-ethnography, or studying sideways, as discussed in Chapter 1. 
 
At the same time, it seems that the comments of the people I interviewed follow Grillo’s 
assertion that the more popular form of understanding of the term “culture” is one more 
rooted in essentialism. As he defines it, “cultural essentialism” refers to “a system of belief 
grounded in a conception of human beings as ‘cultural’ (and under certain conditions 
territorial and national) subjects, i.e. bearers of a culture, located within a boundaried 
world, which defines them and differentiates them from others” (2003, 158). Here, just as 
Angell also points out, this conception of culture appears in a nationalist form as well, in 
the idea of “Turkish” culture. For the interviewees who only mentioned “Turkish” culture 
or “Turkish” people when we were discussing Istanbul, this of course did not necessarily 
include the many long-term and recent populations who do not identify as “Turkish” 
culturally or nationally, or who may not be citizens of Turkey. This thus seemed to 
represent a form of benign nationalism in which such a category was not necessarily 
questioned. For instance, Dilek and I discussed Syrian immigrants to the city at length, and 
she differentiated them from “Turkish people” in her rhetoric. Yavuz described the 
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response of the Japanese people he knew living in Istanbul, and how he thought they were 
more prepared than Turkish people. Thus, while the boundaries of who exactly fell under 
the heading of being “Turkish,” groups of people seen as immigrants or foreigners did not 
seem to be included in this understanding.  
 
The fact that many of my research participants told me similar narratives about fatalism and 
“Turkishness” as a rationale for why people do not prepare is problematic in terms of what 
this widespread type of thinking may effect. Especially when described as something 
unchanging and ingrained in a certain group of people, this type of cultural essentialism 
may prevent analysis of the political, economic and historic reasons why Istanbul residents 
may not be preparing. In fact, many of my interviewees also made comments that could be 
construed as small political critiques, but they accompanied ideas of cultural essentialism at 
the same time (with the exception of Osman). As I have highlighted in Chapter 2, for 
instance, the dominant governing strategy of neoliberalism, the state’s adversarial 
relationship with civil society and its lack of a widespread earthquake readiness plan that 
involves the general population may all be some reasons why inaction is so common in the 
city. These factors do not have to do with “culture” but with political and economic factors 
that have historical roots, but which can always change in the future to different 
constellations of power, since they are not essential but rather the results of struggles over 
power and politics. Secondly, since “culture” seemed to be constructed as an essential 
quality, the fact that so many of my interviewees expressed this may point to a wider 
acceptance of this logic in the preparation community and in Istanbul in general. This in 
itself seems problematic in that it may depress motivation or mobilization efforts: if people 
believe that some people living in Turkey (or “Turkish people,”) will not prepare as an 
inherent quality, they may not do enough to reach out to them or to include them in 
programs, for instance.  
 
While cultural and national essentialism is something that can be espoused in any national 
context, in particular the fact that “Turkish culture” was associated with fatalism, passivity 
and corruption by my interviewees also seemed to recall tropes of Orientalism as well as 
Meltem Ahıska’s concept of Occidentalism. In her article, Ahıska says that notions of what 
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“the West” and “modernization” are like have historically been strategically employed by 
elites in Turkey to justify their policies towards people within Turkey, and that this 
Occidentalism also results from the tensions inherent in failing to address Turkey’s history 
and current status vis-a-vis Western nations, itself, and its own colonizing history (2003). 
However, under this umbrella, Ahıska also points towards the struggles inherent in trying to 
understand one’s own position in this complicated field of power and history. By stating 
that “Turkish people” are inherently predestined towards inaction, this may support elite 
interests in the country today, who would rather that people remain passive and apolitical. 
In this vein of thinking, this embrace of cultural essentialism may be especially problematic 
in that it sets people’s expectations low about their ability to inspire political and physical 
change in the city regarding earthquake readiness.  
 
In a similar fashion, the work of Ayşe Gül Altınay on her study of the justification of 
militarism in Turkey is instructive, since she shows how a notion of “Turkish culture” 
being inherently militaristic justified the introduction of compulsory military service to 
people in a country who had previously associated the military with “war and death” (2004, 
8). By placing the reasoning for this change in the realm of “culture” as opposed to politics 
or national military strategy, it insulated the decision against critique and protest. In the 
same way, the repetition of passiveness as a “Turkish” trait may harm efforts to resist urban 
transformation projects, the covering up of earthquake meeting points, and other such 
projects that are currently underway in the neoliberal restructuring of the city.  
 
However, as noted previously, Osman, among all of the interviewees was the most clear in 
his definition of “Turkish culture” as a certain political environment which suppresses 
dissent and fails to give representation to average citizens. When prompted, he was quick to 
clarify that, as a particular political system, it always had the potential to change in the 
future; in this way he clearly differentiate himself from a biological or essentialist usage of 
“culture.” In his comments, he also offered paths forward through political means, such as 
emphasizing the importance of earthquake meeting points to city officials in charge of such 
decisions. As such, his politicization of the idea of “Turkish culture” was the most non-
essentialist in terms of the space he left for change in the future, and the ways in which he 
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advocated and outlined steps that can be taken, although he was not always optimistic about 
how effective they would be. 
 
At this point, Navaro-Yashin’s application of psychoanalysis to the political in terms of 
Istanbul is important in contextualizing and understanding these statements as well. In her 
ethnography, Navaro-Yashin found that Istanbul residents treated the Turkish state as 
though it were “real,” as though it was a cohesive entity and as though its messages about 
itself could be believed, even as they simultaneously demonstrated that they could “see 
through” the facade of the state by critiquing it. Drawing on Peter Sloterdijk and Slajov 
Zizek, Navaro-Yashin posits that this type of behavior is “cynical” since people are aware 
of the falsity of the state, but yet they still behave as though they do not know this. At the 
same time, this cynicism manifests itself as an idea that “nothing can be done” (“yapacak 
bir şey yok”): “The idea is that things are ‘just bad’ and there is not much hope in trying to 
change them” (2012, 164). In saying that “Turkish people” are “just like this” it seems to 
mirror Navaro-Yashin’s observations about relations to the state in two ways: for one, that 
people constantly espoused a narrative about “Turkish people” as though they believed in 
this concepts, and at the same time, they described “Turkish people” as a group that does 
not take action against risk or other political situations (since the earthquake preparations 
are political in many ways). 
 
For the first aspect, the idea of Turkish people, I did not observe and speak with my 
interviewees long enough on this topic to understand their other thoughts or ideas about 
what “Turkish people” may mean. As noted by Navaro-Yashin, while some people may be 
cynics about the state and Turkish politics, others have repeated such behaviors so much 
that she says they may truly start to believe what they do. At hand in this situation is the 
idea that there is some quality of “Turkish people” versus political and economic realities 
that make it difficult to change the earthquake preparation environment. Instead of 
discussing these issues, such as urban transformation and myriad class issues, the idea that 
“Turkish people” simply don’t take action due to their essential nature seemed to be a 
shorthand way of accounting for the situation. It may have also functioned as a cynical way 
in which people approached this situation, since many may have known that “Turkey” as a 
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nation is an exclusive and violently-formed category of people that was formed as a 
political construction, not a biological reality. Finally, the idea that “Turkish people” are, in 
a way, cynical, and don’t change, seemed to reflect Navaro-Yashin’s point that people 
seemed to be aware of their own cynicism and inaction: 
 
“At this time, it appeared that there was a public awareness of the ordinary cynicism 
that was prevalent. Beyond the sort of consciousness that Zizek allows the subject, I 
will argue that there was even consciousness about one’s own cynical acts in this 
case. Not only an englightened reflection on ideology, as argued by Zizek, but also 
a self-critique of the cynical state of submission and lack of reaction.” (2012, 175) 
 
In this sense, “Turkish people” seemed to refer to the people in one’s social circle or the 
people they knew around them - a reflection on “us” or “we” as people who had “accepted 
the way things were.”  
 
Thus, the question is raised as to on what level the experts I spoke with were self-aware 
about their own cynicism and on what level they perceived “Turkish culture” to be a “real” 
and bounded entity that had effects on the way the earthquake preparations played out. The 
posing of this question adds a layer of understanding to my interviewees as subjects as they 
are thus questioned as subjects who are self-aware and who have a relationship not only to 
their own stated beliefs, but their own possible cynicism. This may show how saying that 
there is “nothing to be done” may be a psychological mechanism in which people are more 
drawn to familiar narratives about themselves and what they can do, as opposed to the 
“fear” inherent in confronting this way of thinking, and in turn, the “real” political 
mechanisms that support the current lack of action. At the same time, in my fieldwork I 
found that some interviewees who drew attention and gave some credibility to these 
narratives were the same ones who also took action in their own lives that tried to improve 
the disaster preparation situation in the city. In this way, this observation may complicate 
the narrative as “cynical Istanbul residents” versus “people who refused cynicism and took 
action.” However, as I will expand upon, only Osman of the interviewees also gave a 
political critique that opposed the cultural essentialism of the “Turkish people are fatalistic” 
idea. While some interviewees may have taken a lot of action in their own careers, they 
appeared to be holding onto some cynical views about their environment at the same time.  
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In another point within her theorization of Occidentalism, Ahıska makes the statement that 
the various power dynamics of the history of Turkey must be grappled with in order to re-
orient Turkish national identity, since otherwise the temporal politics that are a part of 
being on the margins of both “East” and “West,” as well as colonizer and colonized, will 
remain stagnant in time and trapped between these polarized constructions (2003). This 
seems related with her point about how elites in Turkey employ fantasies of “modernity” to 
propel projects in their own interests. Ahıska argues that such an emphasis on speed and 
progress without critically evaluating where Turkey stands in regards to modernity 
ultimately results in a type of inaction or immobility as well, since this drive to “catch the 
West” represents “speed without movement” (2003, 352). While on one hand the urban 
transformation projects embraced by the government seem to fall under this category, 
especially in their emphasis on the future and prosperity as mentioned in Chapter 2, 
Ahıska’s point also seems relevant when considering how these fantasies can be opposed 
by non-elites. Osman’s analysis, which is critical of many dynamics that are sometimes 
taken for granted, seemed to point towards the kind of critical stance that would be needed 
to be able to escape elite appeals that are based on a deliberate misunderstanding of history 
and power in Turkey. At the same time, his emphasis on the idea that it is not something 
rooted in “culture” but rather in the various aspects of political power, both currently and 
historically, that make preparation difficult also rejects a cynical idea of the preparation 
environment being difficult simply due to an essential “Turkish culture”; it also paves a 
way to re-consider how political power has been used by elites to influence sections of 
society with less power based on ideas of what “Turkey,” “modernity,” and “the West” 
might mean in a political and historical outlook.  
 
It seems that, going forward, while there was more overlap in epistemological fields when I 
discussed issues of culture with my interviewees, the notions they employed may have 
harmful effects when considering possible futures for Istanbul earthquake readiness 
measures. “Turkish culture,” left unclarified, may reify the people living in the country of 
Turkey today and may delimit possibilities for the future through its essentialism. It may, at 
the same time, draw attention away from the political, historical and economic dynamics 
that compose the city of Istanbul today and which have led to the current state of 
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preparation efforts. Whether these rhetorics were employed through cynicism or through 
true belief, as narratives that circulated in society either way, they had a negative and 
disempowering effect in both cases. As I cover in the final chapter, however, not only 
Osman but also Hüseyin illuminated some paths forward in terms of changing and 
improving how earthquake readiness is conducted in the city. By taking a critical approach 
to Istanbul’s current actors and politics and by outlining possible actions that can be taken 
to affect preparation, they helped to break the impasse of cultural essentialism’s inherent 
lack of action just as their proactive vision converted feelings of anxiety into preparatory 
action. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this thesis, I attempt to shed light on some of the conditions, opinions, feelings, and 
realities of experts working in fields connected to earthquake preparation in Istanbul. As 
experts, I attempted to learn something from their expertise in urban planning, engineering, 
architecture, and disaster management, while at the same time taking an anthropological 
approach to our interactions in our interviews.  
 
In terms of the wider landscape that my interviewees were a part of, this thesis argues that 
“disaster neoliberalism” defined the current preparation efforts for a large earthquake in 
Istanbul. Drawing on both the work of Vivian Choi and Sumru Tamer and showing how 
their observations are similar in terms of the nationalistic elements of the situation, my idea 
of disaster neoliberalism emphasizes how responsibility is largely left on the shoulders of 
ordinary residents and individuals, and that it is largely based on class. In the same way, my 
point in the beginning of Chapter 4 is linked to this idea: while disasters always open 
spaces after their occurance and while the preparation for possible disasters can allow for 
productive action by some groups in society, in terms of the Istanbul case, this productivity 
only seemed possible for the largest and most economically powerful actors such as the 
state and large companies. This argument serves as a counterpoint to the larger trend in risk 
studies right now which is focused on how states, large institutions and some individuals 
profit from disaster or make it “productive,” such as in the work of Naomi Klein and 
Caitlin Zaloom. My argument concerns the level of scale in this situation, since individuals 
were often left with less resources and information, and as such this risk was a financial 
burden in many cases as opposed to an opportunity. In line with David Harvey’s thinking 
on this point, this structure poses particular issue to the most marginalized residents in the 
city as they also live in some of the least earthquake-resistant housing. Finally, I also tie in 
the idea of the “neurotic citizen” by Engin Isin, who theorizes the current status of 
neoliberalism as “neuroliberalism.” The state governs its subjects through their anxiety and 
neuroses, which goes against the main figure of “risk society” as formulated by Ulrich 
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Beck. Instead of a “sufficient, calculating, responsible, autonomous, and unencumbered” 
subject, the neurotic citizen governs itself through its own anxiety; in this case, the anxiety 
about a possible earthquake is left to such individual “neurotic citizens” while the state 
does not provide as much assistance on such issues (Boyer 2008). 
 
In the particular form of neoliberalism I outlined, disaster neoliberalism, members of 
universities and civil society organizations seemed to be pressured and negotiating to both 
take action within the disaster preparation field just as they needed to defend their work and 
their own position. I link this back to the oversized position of the state in my fieldwork, 
which was represented in some ways by the role of the greater municipality and AFAD 
when it came to the disaster preparations. While more research needs to be conducted as to 
the relationship between state institutions and Islamic civil society groups presently, this 
thesis shows that people within secularist non-governmental organizations felt blocked, 
pressured or ignored by the state insitutions at different levels of their work, depending on 
the mechanisms and particular interactions with various state institutions. In terms of 
scientists, they also had to navigate this complicated terrain as public figures who spoke to 
the media and by extension, the Istanbul population at large. Citing Joffe et al., this thesis 
adds to their arguments by demonstrating that Istanbul scientists also negotiated the line 
between under- and over-emphasizing the earthquake risk, but in the case of Istanbul they 
dealt with a more sensational media environment with many figures claiming to have 
“predicted” the earthquake. As residents and experts at the same time, my thesis shows that 
the prediction issue was “closer to home” for my interviewees, since they were making 
statements that would affect the city that they themselves live in. 
 
At the same time, while the effects cannot be clearly discerned, due to the illiberal nature of 
the current government, it seemed as though experts also needed to temper their statements 
in order to conform to state interests at the same time in their comments to the media, such 
as not stipulating which neighborhoods were at a higher risk. This accompanies my 
argument concerning the role of the state in disaster neoliberalism: mainly that its priority 
seemed to be enabling companies to profit from massive urban transformation projects 
while offering little to ordinary residents in terms of information, guidance or resouces to 
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help prepare. The state also took on an outsized role in name with the formation of AFAD 
in 2009, and as I show by drawing on the work of Marlene Schäfers and Sumru Tamer, 
AFAD seemed to have played a part in the marginalization of civil society organizations as 
well. This research thus expands on their work in showing how the state-capital partnership 
is also part of a larger restructuring of the state through the centralization of state 
institutions. This adds an illiberal dimension to this form of neoliberalism, and shows how 
the state’s attempts at gaining more hegemony and control also benefit the private 
companies aligned with the state. In this sense, the thesis demonstrates that while pre-
disaster efforts may be lacking on the part of the state and suppressed when it comes to 
civil society organizations, the centralized mechanism of AFAD may help to ensure control 
of a post-disaster scenario in Istanbul in line with previous examples showed by Tamer and 
Schäfers, as well as internationally as shown by Klein in her description of disaster 
capitalism. In this sense, my fieldwork represents a change from the article surveying some 
of the dynamics of Istanbul earthquake preparation as covered by Elizabeth Angell (2014), 
mainly through the increased presence of and pressure from the state. Angell’s overview on 
how the built environment of the city reflects, mediates and opens way for residents to 
address politics and government largely holds true for the time of my fieldwork as well; 
however, this thesis shows that my interviewees were working in a city with increased 
limitations and perhaps a more prominent sense of cynicism and humorous response 
mechanisms in order to deal with this change in conditions. 
 
This thesis all represents an attempt to shed light on the ways in which affect and emotion 
have influenced experts by calling on the works of Dominic Boyer, Joffe et al., Sara 
Ahmed and Yael Navaro-Yashin. Another theme I highlighted was the status of the experts 
as people who were both professionals and long-term residents of Istanbul at the same time. 
In the context of forecasted major earthquake, this added an extra emotional dimension to 
their work and an to their stance as residents themselves. Thus, while part of their work 
involved strategic navigation of various pressures they were responding to in the disaster 
preparation field, which is typically understood as something “rational,” emotion also 
affected their work and played a part in our interviews as well. As demonstrated by Joffe et 
al. and as was also the case in my findings, scientists used the emotional boundary work of 
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stigmatizing certain other researchers in order to privilege long-term forecasting over short-
term prediction of earthquakes. In our interviews, the use of humor by experts seemed to be 
a way in which they maintained a professional demeanor with me, which was important for 
the performance of expertise. Humor or laughing provided a way to regulate that 
performance instead of showing more negative or “maudlin” emotions since it may have 
served as a “release valve” for other emotions (Kuipers 2008). At the same time, this “joke-
work” seemed to help cope with a political system that seemed illogical or counterintuitive, 
in part due to its illiberal aspects. It may have helped with fostering in-group feeling as 
well. On the other hand, Navaro-Yashin’s description of cynicism as a popular affective 
positionality may also be applied to the humor and joking employed, especially when such 
jokes failed to address the political system or when their premise was that the situation 
would not change. This went along with the theorization by Trnka that laughter may have 
acted as a substitute for a closer emotional or critical evaluation of the topic (2011). 
 
 Additionally, this thesis demonstrates how my interviewees reacted emotionally to these 
points of difference regarding preparation. Drawing on theories of affect developed by Sara 
Ahmed and applying them to the case of experts, this thesis showed how this difference 
sometimes made them affectively alienated compared to the people close to them, such as 
friends and family. They confronted the cynicism dominant in the current environment (as 
described by Yael Navaro-Yashin and employed as a theory in this research) by taking 
action and by pointing out political dynamics that can change and improve in the future, 
such as comments by Osman and Hüseyin that citizens and civil society groups can 
pressure government institutions. This point about experts’ emotional and affective 
positionality and subjectivity is important when we consider how experts face many 
challenges in fields such as earthquake preparation. For instance, they emotionally face not 
only the possibility of a disaster, but also their own “otherness” in comparison to the many 
people who would rather respond with inaction or denial. Just as experts perform boundary 
work in a way that takes social and emotional factors into account, experts’ emotional 
dispositions towards the earthquake risk play an important role in showing both how they 
seemed to be the ones who motivated others around them to prepare. At the same time, it is 
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imporantant to note that they also took an emotional burden through their affective distance 
from the majority. 
 
Finally, I explore the frequent occurance of an idea that it is a “Turkish” trait to be fatalistic 
and to fail to take preparatory action for a future disaster. I argue that this idea by itself may 
have a negative effect on preparation as it is based in an idea of “culture” and thus may be 
essential and unable to be changed. Referring to theories by Meltem Ahıska, this thesis also 
argues that such an idea may also be harmful due to the ways in which elites may benefit 
from the decreased motivation and action that accompanies this notion based in how 
“Eastern” people behave on an essentialist level. It also may represent a particularly 
rhetorical cynicism as studied by Navaro-Yashin and referenced previously.  
 
Despite these more cynical or inactive approaches, as individuals, my interviewees 
participated in earthquake preparedness activities both through jobs and often as volunteer 
activities and hobbies. Many of the experts I spoke to displayed their personal commitment 
to this issue, and spoke about things they wanted to do in the future on this issue, from 
writing books, attending conferences, giving more trainings, conducting future international 
research, and conducting new surveys of Istanbul neighborhoods. At a time when there has 
been much discussion about the “right to the city” on the part of its residents, the experts 
and activists I spoke with offered labor and emotional stances that worked to combat 
helplessness, cynicism and inaction concerning this issue, and they did this despite the new 
pressure and lack of space to act within the preparation field due to the encroachment of the 
state. The issues outlined in this thesis paint a picture of some substantial issues concerning 
earthquake preparation in the city, and various forms of inaction due to the current structure 
of the state under the state-capital partnership and disaster neoliberalism. Through 
understanding more about this inaction and the way in which it is approached in the city 
today, I have attempted to demonstrate some gaps to be filled and thus some ways forward 
to both understand the experts working on these issues as well as the preparations 
themselves. As my interviewee Hüseyin said at the end of our interview, the phrase should 
not be “yapacak bir şey yok” (there is nothing to be done) but rather “yapacak çok şey var” 
  
82 
(there are many things to do) in regards to working towards the creation of a city and its 
buildings that are safe for all Istanbul residents. 
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